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SWEDISH POLICY TOWARDS REFUGEES

Introduction

The crisis concerning refugees in a varying degree affects European countries, because despite the competences transferred to the European Community to conduct the common migration and asylum policy, the states retained independence in relation to the application of the integration model². The lack of common legal regulations caused the chaos and the lack of strategies in the situation of the intensification of war activities in the world. It [the lack] also contributed to the uncontrolled growth of influx of refugees, including such countries as Syria and Iraq. The main direction of migration is just a few countries belonging to the EU. It is worth noting that some of them, such as Bulgaria and Greece, represent in this case the transit countries, and Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands – represent the countries of destination³. This asymmetry of migration flows contributes to the increasing problems of target countries associated with the need to secure the livelihoods for the migrants who arrived.

This article analysis the problem with migration in the Kingdom of Sweden. Despite its marginal position with respect to Central Europe, the concept of equal, egalitarian and open society is quite rapidly developing there. They managed to introduce such a very efficient system to create favourable conditions for investors, a competitive economy, and to provide the society with social support, and also the

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² European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: On a Community immigration policy*, COM(2000) 757, retrieved 12.03.2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0757>; European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration, integration and employment*, COM(2003) 336 final, 3.1, retrieved 12.03.2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=C ELEX:52003DC0336>.

³ Eurostat, *Countries of origin of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU-28 Member States*, 2014 and 2015 (thousands of first time applicants), retrieved 10.03.2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Countries_of_origin_of_%28non-EU%29_asylum_seekers_in_the_EU-28_Member_States,_2014_and_2015_%28thousands_of_first_time_applicants%29_YB16.png.

income which guarantees a decent life. On the one hand, in Sweden there is a model of society based on knowledge, which has a direct impact on the competitiveness of the economy⁴. On the other hand, one cannot forget about the social sphere⁵ through which the internal policy in Sweden is organised in such a way so that it should suit the needs and challenges of the global economy⁶.

The aim of this study is to present conditions, the essence and experience of Sweden in the context of the refugee policy. What factors influenced the formation of attitude towards the immigrants? It should be noted that the integration of foreigners in all the EU countries is significantly different in terms of the concept of integration and in terms of the results arising from the application of specific strategies⁷. One can distinguish several basic elements that are the source of these differences: a general economic situation of the state, geographical and political factors, different concepts of integration to participate in a national community, a different history of migration flows, the structure of foreigners, the presence of national minorities in a given country, the degree of redistribution of national income and the attitude of public opinion towards immigrants.

Determinants of migration policy in Sweden

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy. Since 1st January, 1995 it has belonged to the European Union. Half of its territory is covered by forests and lakes. The country is inhabited by approximately 9.7 million inhabitants, the majority of them in the southern part. It belongs to the highly developed countries, whose GDP per capita is approximately 56 thousand dollars. The unemployment rate is at a low level (8% for the year 2015)⁸. It should be emphasised that Sweden is one of the most competitive world economies⁹, where social issues have not become secondary. This is confirmed by one of the lowest levels of social inequality (the Gini index)¹⁰ or the 14th place in the ranking of HDI¹¹. Refugees choose Sweden

⁴ Manuel Castells, Pekka Himanen, *Spółeczeństwo informacyjne i państwo dobrobytu*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej 2009, Włodzimierz Anioł, *Szlak Norden. Modernizacja po skandynawsku*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2013).

⁵ Beata Rogowska, „Teoria i nauka ekonomii z perspektywy szkoły sztokholmskiej”, in: *Północ w międzynarodowej przestrzeni politycznej i gospodarczej*, ed. Magdalena Tomala, Michał Łuszczuk, (Kielce: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jana Kochanowskiego, 2015), 163–176.

⁶ Magdalena Tomala, „Wybrane wskaźniki funkcjonowania społeczeństwa informacyjnego w regionie nordyckim”, *Studia Humanistyczno-Społeczne*, 2012, nr 6, 83–94.

⁷ Anna Kicingier, „Unia Europejska wobec zagadnienia integracji imigrantów”, *CEFMR Working Paper*, 2005, nr 2, retrieved 2.02.2016, http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2005-02.pdf.

⁸ The World Factbook, *Sweden*, retrieved 10.02.2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html>.

⁹ World Economic Forum, *The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016*, Geneva 2015, retrieved 20.02.2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_1.pdf.

¹⁰ The World Bank, *Gini coefficient*, retrieved 20.02.2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

¹¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015. Work for Human Development*, New York 2015, retrieved 20.02.2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_1.pdf.

because of the ease of obtaining an asylum, a citizenship and generous social welfare. These factors decided that Sweden recently became the second after Germany, most frequently chosen by refugees country to settle.

The issues related to immigrants are in the Kingdom of Sweden very essential. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, Sweden did not suffer significant losses after the Second World War. It was not occupied by the Germans, and its infrastructure and industries were not destroyed during the war. As a result, after the war, it could benefit from the incoming labour from the countries that were much more affected by the war. Secondly, it should be noted that the economic situation in the countries affected by war placed the Swedish industry in a favourable situation on the world market¹². The above mentioned economic factors contributed to the unprecedented in the history of Sweden influx of immigrants. The chart below presents the data regarding the influx of immigrants to Sweden in the period between 1980 and 2014 (see fig.1).




Fig. 1. The influx of immigrants to Sweden in the period between 1980 and 2014

Source: retrieved 20.01.2016, <https://sweden.se/migration/#2013>.

As Marie Demker indicates, in the 40's and 50's about 30 thousand immigrants annually used to come to Sweden. The number of indigenous people of the Kingdom of Sweden was then only approximately 7 million¹³. In the following years, there was an even greater influx of people into this country, reaching its peak in 1970 - 77 326 immigrants. As the chart shows, in Sweden one can notice a growing trend of influx of people from abroad. The refugees from the active war

¹² Ryszard M. Czarny, *Szwecja w Unii Europejskiej. Studium polityczno-prawne*, (Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Ubezpieczeń, 2002), 57–58.

¹³ Marie Demker, *Attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. Swedish trends with some comparison*, Goteborg 2007, 6, retrieved 26.01.2016 <http://www.mim.org.gu.se/pdf/attitudes%20toward%20immigrants%20and%20refugees.%20isa%202007.pdf>.

zones choose Sweden as a destination country of migration, which is shown by an increase in traffic migration in the 90s of the twentieth century in connection with the war in Iraq or the war in Syria (now). The spokesman for the Swedish Migration Agency, Fredrik Bengtsson, said that the year 2014 was the second in the history after 1992 as far as the influx of asylum applications. There was then the highest level of submitted applications - 84 000¹⁴. As it was pointed out by Bengtsson, many immigrants fled from the former Yugoslavia to apply for asylum in Sweden¹⁵. This is mainly due to the fact that Sweden granted Syrians an asylum residence permit. As a result of the influx of people to Sweden, one can observe an increase in the population of this country, which Chart 2 shows.




Fig. 2. Population in Sweden in the period between 1980 and 2014

Source: retrieved 21.01.2016, <https://sweden.se/migration/#2013>.

An open migration policy contributes to the population growth. As a result of this, Sweden avoided the crisis of the shrinking population of the state. Between the years 1980 and 2014 approximately 1.5 million people came to Sweden. As a result of migration processes one can say that Sweden is a multicultural country because as many as 20% of the population come from outside. As Monika Banaś points out, "It is a multicultural country, which reconciles the needs and interests of a culturally diverse community"¹⁶. The data of Swedish Migration Agency¹⁷ show that immigrants are a group of approximately 2 million residents who were born abroad or had both parents of non-Swedish nationality. The table below shows the structure of Swedish society, including the nationalities of 20 most numerous represented groups in Sweden (see Table 1).

¹⁴ *Sweden and migration*, retrieved 10.02.2016 <https://sweden.se/migration/#2013>.

¹⁵ *The integration issue*, retrieved 31.01.2016, <https://sweden.se/migration/>.

¹⁶ Monika Banaś, *Wielość kultur, różnorodność tradycji, jedno społeczeństwo. Szwedzki model polityki integracyjnej*, retrieved 29.01.2016, <http://www.ism.wsmip.uj.edu.pl/documents/3337228/64d5af4d-167e-4f49-bf92-120135d1a1df>.

¹⁷ Retrieved 20.01.2016, <http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Our-organisation.html>.

Tab. 1. Nationality in Sweden

Nationality	Number of people	Nationality	Number of people
Finland	158 488	Denmark	42 374
Irak	130 168	Norway	42 301
Poland	81 697	Thailand	38 129
Iran	68 436	China	28 699
Former Yugoslavia	67 892	Afghanistan	28 443
Syria	67 671	Chille	28 216
Bosnia and Herzegovina	57 289	Liban	25 699
Somalia	56 906	Romania	24 666
Germany	49 359	The Great Britan	24 399
Turkey	46 146	India	21 929

Source: retrieved 20.01.2016, http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/sv/ssd/STA_RT_BE_BE0101_BE0101E/UtrikesFoddaR/?parttable=&rxid=5ac774ac-70a8-4114-844e-47451b5d5324.

According to the official data, the representatives of as many as 200 nationalities live in this nearly 10-million country. This ratio is the highest among all the Scandinavian states and is one of the highest in Europe. As it is indicated by the Swedish Statistical Office, among the citizens of the European Union countries, besides the Finns, the Polish people constitute the largest group in this country. According to the latest data, 81 697 Poles and people of Polish origin live in Sweden. Among the EU nations, Finns constitute a larger group (more than 158 488), who for years because of the historical ties with Sweden and Swedish language have willingly settle in this country. In addition, among the EU citizens, the following nations live in Sweden: Danes (42 374), Germans (more than 49 359), the British, Hungarians and Romanians (more than 20 thousand in each group). Quite a lot of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (about 68 thousand), Turks (almost 46 thousand) and Norwegians (42 thousand) have settled in Sweden. A large group of migrants also come from Asia (mainly from Iraq and Iran) and also migrants with African roots (mainly Somali and Ethiopian)¹⁸. Recently, the Syrians are the largest group arriving to this country.

The refugees occupy a special place among the migrants. Integration and also immigration policy should be treated in a consistent manner. As it is pointed out by Eytan Meyers, the former policy is a part of the latter policy, and the latter one is formed under the influence of the former one¹⁹. The chart below shows the ratio of

¹⁸ Statistikdatabasen, *Utrikes födda i riket efter födelseland, ålder och kön. År 2000–2015*, retrieved 15.03.2016, http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/sv/ssd/START_BE_BE0101_BE0101E/UtrikesFoddaR/?parttable=&rxid=5ac774ac-70a8-4114-844e-47451b5d5324.

¹⁹ Eytan Meyers, "Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis", *International Migration Review*, vol. 34 (2000): 1245.

migrants to the number of refugees in Sweden.




Fig. 3. The ratio of migrants to the number of refugees in Sweden

Source: retrieved 21.01.2016, <http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statistics-/Statistics/Overview-and-time-series.html>.

On the basis of the ratio of the number of migrants to the number of refugees it results that every year approximately three times less refugees than migrants come to Sweden. For instance, in 2014, the number of refugees as compared to the number of immigrants accounted for only approximately 30%-group, and the ratio was higher than in previous years (eg. in 2000 it was only 17%). This is due to reasons for which the population migrates to Sweden. For instance, in 2010, the migrants indicated as the most important reason the issue relating to the labour market (21%), then a family reunification (20%). The third place was occupied by the issues related to the free movement of people within the EU and EEA (18%), the fourth place – students (14%), and finally the fifth reason were the issues related to the refugees (12%)²⁰.

This ratio indicates more about the economic motives of the people's influx to Sweden than the dangers arising from military operations. These data show that by 2014 the refugees themselves would not be a problem in Sweden as together with economic migrants. The chart below presents data on the number of people applying for asylum.

²⁰ Migration Agency, retrieved 10.03.2016, <http://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.5e83388f141c129ba63127cf/1381926423143/Beviljade+uppeh%C3%A5llstillst%C3%A5nd+och+registrerade+uppeh%C3%A5llsr%C3%A4tter+2010.pdf>.




Fig. 4. Distribution of the population by nationality of asylum seekers

Source: Migration Agency, retrieved 10.03.2016, <http://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.5e83388f141c129ba63127cf/1381926423143/Beviljade+uppeh%C3%A5llstillst%C3%A5nd+och+registrerade+uppeh%C3%A5llsr%C3%A4tter+2010.pdf>.

After analysing the data of asylum seekers, it turns out that the largest group is the population of the countries of the former Yugoslavia (26%), and the next largest group are Iraqis (12%), and only the third group are Syrians (8%). In 2014 every fifth immigrant was from Syria, which caused that this year they constituted the single largest group of people who came to Sweden. The data presented in the chart show that for decades this country has been opened up to the refugees from Bosnia, Iraq or Somalia, and recently also from Syria. In view of the scale of the phenomenon in recent years, the problem of migrants has been on the increase. This is evidenced by the number of applications for the asylum. Recently Sweden has considered at least 4 thousand applications for the asylum. The second reason is the fact that although Germany has totally received more people, the number of accepted applications for asylum to 100 thousand residents in 2014, Sweden has received more of them (more than 300 per 100 thousand inhabitants as compared to 50 in Germany). According to the recent data from the Swedish Migration Agency, in 2015 approximately 190 thousand refugees - two and a half times more than in 2014 (80 thousand) applied for asylum.

Laws and regulations concerning the refugees in Sweden

Crossing the border and stay of foreigners in Sweden is strictly regulated. Similarly, the labour market is controlled. Visa regulations, the right of residence

and work permit in Sweden are varied, depending on the nationality of the visitor.

The law governing the issue of residence permits in Sweden are called *Utlänningslagen*²¹ and *Utlänningsförfordningen*²². The government may issue new rules and make the guiding decisions in specific cases. The Commission for Foreigners (*Utlänningsnämnden*) is entitled also to the latter right.

According to the law on foreigners (*Utlänningslagen*), it is assumed that a foreigner arriving in Sweden had earlier received the required permit for residence or for residence and work. If a person applies for any of these permits after crossing the Swedish border, he/she must take into account a quick denial without giving reasons. This law is applied to citizens of countries outside the EU or the European Economic Area.

A central institution responsible for visa issues, permanent residence permits, asylum and the change of citizenship is the Office for Migration – *Migrationsverket*. This Office is subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Utrikesdepartementet*) in migration issues and to the Ministry of Justice (*Justitiedepartementet*) in matters of granting citizenship. In matters relating to the migration the Office cooperates with other authorities, such as embassies and consulates, the police, the office for the integration, etc. The Office for Migration has its headquarters in Norrköping. It also has local branches, where one can search for current information and submit applications. The highest court of appeal in matters of migration and citizenship is the Commission for Foreigners – *Utlänningsnämnden*. It is appointed by the government from among candidates put forward by political parties. Generally, one cannot lodge an appeal against the decision. The only possibility is to lodge an appeal to the government, which [the appeal] is considered only in principal cases. This Commission was established in 1992²³.

The attitude of Swedes to refugees and migrants

The increase in the number of immigrants in the mid-90s and a real “explosion” of the influx of newcomers from other countries in recent years tends to reflect on the process of integration of people who came with the local community. Sweden is a country which since 1986 has been monitoring the attitude of Swedes to migrants, including refugees. The research is conducted, among others, at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Gothenburg under the leadership of Sören Holmberg. Since 1992 this research has been cyclical.

Although, as Swedner claims, little is known about the attitudes of Swedes

²¹ *Utlänningslagen, Kraven för utlänningars vistelse i Sverige*, 1989:529 (UtlL), retrieved 10.02.2016, <http://rkrattsbaser.gov.se/sfst?bet=1989:529>.

²² *Utlänningsförfordningen, Kraven för utlänningars vistelse i Sverige*, 1989:547 (UtlF) retrieved 10.02.2016, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Svenskforfattningssamling-201_sfs-1989-547/#K1.

²³ Ryszard M. Czarny, op. cit., 22.

towards refugees before 1986, there are indications about the discriminatory behavior against minorities already in the 60s of the twentieth century. He says that xenophobic attitudes were then more evident than in modern times²⁴.

As the research by M. Demker shows this trend in the twentieth century did not change considerably. However, the reluctance to accept new refugees intensified. This change was visible until 1992 when the attitude of Swedes was mitigated (see fig. 5). The chart below shows the attitude of the Swedish society (presented in percentage) towards the increase or decrease in the number of refugees in Sweden²⁵.




Fig. 5. The attitude of the Swedish society (presented in percentage) towards the increase or decrease in the number of refugees in Sweden

Źródło: M. Demker, *Attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. Swedish trends with some comparison*, Goteborg 2007, 6, retrieved 26.01.2016, <http://www.mim.org.gu.se/pdf/attitude%20toward%20immigrants%20and%20refugees.%20isa%202007.pdf>

The trend shown in the chart is decreasing both if we analyse the attitude of Swedes with their negative attitude, and those who approve accepting migrants. Negative attitudes of the Swedish society towards the accepting migrants is directly proportional to the increasing influx of people. This means that with an increase in the number of newcomers to Sweden, the positive attitude towards newcomers also increases. This does not change the fact that still the majority of the population (ie. more than 50%) in the analysed period was against the influx of migrants.

The research conducted by Demker showed, however, that the situation is

²⁴ Harald Swedner, *Sociologiska synpunkter på minoritetsproblemet i Sverige, w Svenska minoriteter*, ed. David Schwartz, (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1966).

²⁵ Marie Demker, op. cit.

different if we consider the issue of migrants and their cultural roots, and not only a group of refugees. In the years 1993, 1997, 1999 and 2004 Demker asked the Swedes four questions 1) about their attitude to migrants, 2) religion, 3) participation in organisations against racism and 4) the acceptance of person from outside Sweden to the family. The results of this research are presented in the chart below.




Fig. 6. Swedish attitude to migrant

Source: Marie Demker, *Attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. Swedish trends with some comparison*, Goteborg 2007, 6, retrieved 26.01.2016, <http://www.mim.org.gu.se/pdf/atititudes%20toward%20immigrants%20and%20refugees%20isa%2007.pdf>.

While analysing the chart we can observe reduced skepticism about the influx of migrants. The situation is similar in the case of adoption of foreigners to the family. In both cases, within a decade the negative attitude of the Swedes decreased by approximately 10%. Readiness to engage in the activities of the organisation against racism and xenophobia increased at the same time by approximately 7%. However, only 40% of the Swedes agree that migrants could cultivate their faith and religious beliefs without limitation. These data confirm that although the Swedes are open to immigrants, they expect from them to be integrated with the local community. Demker's research confirms that for the assimilation of newcomers arriving in the country is up to 80% of the population (data of 2004).

The presented data confirm that Sweden was perceived for years as a stable and tolerant state. However, in recent years (2014-2015) the influx of migrants has been so great that Sweden has serious problems with the immigration policy. For fear of the rising costs of care for asylum seekers, a part of the society has begun to question its [Sweden] policy and approach to the migrants' admission more and more cautiously. According to the survey which was conducted on a sample of one thousand people at the beginning of November 2015 at the request of the

newspaper "Svenska Dagbladet", at least 41% is for a reduction in the number of permits as compared to 29% in September 2015. For the maintenance of the current level of the number of the accepted applications is one Swede in four, and 17% want to increase this number. This trend was confirmed by another survey published in the "Dagens Nyheter" newspaper. It shows that currently 26% of respondents believe that the Scandinavian country should take more migrants as compared to 44% as early as in September 2015. 42% of respondents want to reduce the number of accepted applications for asylum as compared to 30% in September 2015. According to the research, the men and right-wing voters take the strictest position on this issue. For a reduction in the number of accepted applications for staying in Sweden are 96% supporters of the nationalist party *Ny Demokratie* (the Sweden Democrats)²⁶.

The data confirm that in a relatively short time (3 months) the opinion of the Swedish public on migrants changed a lot although in 2014 the influx of migrants was significant. One can therefore conclude that the new trend does not result only from the intensification of the immigration phenomenon, but also from external factors, such as, among others, the responsibility of the media for reliable information to the public about the problem of refugees, or the attitude of other countries to migration policy, as well as the lack of solidarity of other EU countries on taking responsibility for refugees.

The problem of immigration in the programmes of the Swedish political parties

To understand the phenomenon of integration or assimilation of migrants in Sweden, one should examine how society's expectations are fulfilled in the programmes of political parties. The issue of immigration in the Kingdom of Sweden began to be the subject of a political debate rather late, that is in the 90s of the twentieth century. Previously, no political party considered the migration policy in their election programme. It was treated as an element of foreign policy. In the elections in 1991 on the political scene a new party *New Democracy* (*Ny Demokrati*) appeared, which as the first one included in its agenda the issues of immigration. The group was associated with the classic neoliberal and anti-establishment mainstream, and then with anti-immigrant slogans. *Ny Demokrati* gained 6,7% of society support, which gave it 25 seats in the Parliament (for 349 available seats). However, in the next election in 1994 this party lost its significance, and its representatives received support only in local elections. The lack of social acceptance of anti-immigrant policy caused that despite the adoption of a substantial portion of the refugees from the Balkans by Sweden in the 90s of the twentieth century, no other political party took into account the issue of

²⁶ „Szwecja: opinia publiczna coraz bardziej nieprzychylna migrantom”, 9.11.2015, retrieved 12.03.2016, <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/szwecja-opinia-publiczna-coraz-bardziej-nieprzychylna-migrantom/c6mw8f>.

immigration in the election programmes. Only in 2002 the liberal party in their election slogans exhorted that obtaining citizenship should depend on the knowledge of the Swedish language. This case, however, was a priority in the campaign. However, it should be noted that in the 2006 election, the xenophobic, extreme right-wing party - *Sverigedemokraterna* - achieved some success, getting 2,9% of the votes, but not enough to have its own representation in the Parliament.

While evaluating the immigration policy of the Swedish political parties in the last few decades, one can notice that it has focused primarily on the issues related to the creation of tools for the integration of newcomers with the local community. The social welfare was very important. The state guaranteed the refugees accommodation in the Center and benefits in the amount of approximately 70 Swedish crowns a day. The large families were privileged. The state guaranteed allowances for children, enabled them to learn their mother tongue at school. All foreigners were also entitled to have an interpreter in offices and medical outpatient clinics. A refugee, who received an asylum, was given benefits of approximately 6,5 thousand crowns and was under the care of the Job Agency. The Community was obligated to give assistance in finding a house/flat. Municipal premises were allocated for this purpose, and a refugee obtained an allowance to cover the rent or social supplement. It should be noted that the support for refugees in Sweden is quite high. A refugee has an obligation to be active when looking for a job, to attend a free Swedish language course or to participate in the integration activities. To obtain citizenship, the knowledge of the Swedish language is not even required.

According to the Swedish Government, the aim of the migration policy is to ensure - in the long term - a policy which safeguards the rights of refugees. As part of a balanced migration policy, it facilitates the cross-border mobility, promotes labour migration, and takes into account the impact of migration on development and deepening of the European and international cooperation²⁷. It should be emphasised that a balanced migration policy requires high legal standards, including transparent management, professional government agencies and the judicial control system.

Sweden as one of the few European countries meets the specified criteria. It has a stable asylum system in terms of legal security and the potential to contribute to the professional development of migrants. It may therefore contribute to the increase of economic growth, the increase of revenues, the investment in education and health care, the entrepreneurship and new jobs creation, the development of knowledge, ideas and transfer of knowledge, and also better contacts.

However, the uncontrolled influx of refugees to Sweden and the open door policy contributed to changing the position of the ruling party. On 25th November 2015 a new position of Sweden towards the refugees was presented at the joint conference by the Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, and by the Deputy Prime Minister, Åsa Romson. The below mentioned issues were among the most

²⁷ Government Offices of Sweden, *Migration policy objectives*, retrieved 31.01.2016, <http://www.government.se/government-policy/migration/migration-policy-objectives/>.

important provisions:

- the tightening of border controls,
- permissions for temporary residence,
- the limitation of the right to family reunification.

New rules were adopted for a period of three years. As the leader of the left party, Jonas Sjöstedt, said, "Sweden was a light in the darkness, but today this light has been turned off [...]. Most of the refugees do not have documents, so now they will not be able to cross the borders to seek asylum"²⁸. For the Deputy Prime Minister, Åsa Romson, a member of the Social Democratic Green Party, which was the most friendly party towards refugees, the decision of the Swedish authorities will make the lives of refugees even more uncertain. Anna Kinberg Batra, a leader of the Swedish center-right bloc, approves the decisions of the government, but she acknowledged that the above mentioned restrictions were not enough. In turn, the representatives of the far-right Sweden Democrats found that the state authorities were doing too little to stop the wave of refugees, and their actions were too late²⁹.

The Ny Demokrati party, proposing radical changes in immigration policy, primarily uses the Swedes expectations with respect to solving the problem of migrants in recent years. Election slogans are focused on limiting immigrants by 80-90%. The views of the President of Ny Demokrati, Jimmie Åkesson, are shared by more and more Swedes. Evidence of this is the change of electoral support in the last election³⁰.

In the elections in 2014, his party won 12,9% of the votes, which gave it [the party] a third political position in the country, after the Social Democrats (31.2% of support) and conservatives (23,3%). This was the best result in the party's history, as compared to the year 2010 the support for this group increased almost twice (in the election four years ago, they received 5,7% of the votes, previously they always obtained less than 3%). They are the biggest winners of the elections in 2014 while considering the fact that by the mid-90s of the twentieth century, Sweden Democrats were marginalised in public opinion. Since then their anti-immigrant views have not changed much, despite the fact that now they put themselves in the position of the guardian of the welfare state.

²⁸ „Szwecja już nie chce uchodźców?”, *Newsweek*, 25.11.2015, retrieved 10.03.2016, <http://swiat.newsweek.pl/szwecja-maksymalnie-ograniczy-liczbe-przyjmowanych-uchodzcow,artykuly,374656,1.html>.

²⁹ „Szwecja zapowiada wydalenie z kraju od 60 do 80 tys. imigrantów”, *PAP*, 28.01.2016, retrieved 16.03.2016, <http://www.pap.pl/kraje-swiata/ameryka-polnocna/news,461986,szwecja-zapowiada-wydalenie-z-kraju-od-60-do-80-tys-imigrantow.html>.

³⁰ „Skrajnie prawicowa partia największa w Szwecji”, *Euractive.pl*, 21.08.2015, retrieved 5.03.2016, <http://www.euractiv.pl/demokracja/wywiad/sonda-skrajnie-prawicowa-partia-najwiksza-w-szwecji-007217>.

Summary

This article shows a model of integration policy applied in Sweden during the migration crisis in the European Union. Summarising, one can notice that multiculturalism may be a great opportunity, but also a challenge for the countries.

Over the years, Sweden has been characterised by openness to other cultures and nationalities. A steady stream of migrants in the period after the Second World War led to the increased tolerance and acceptance of Swedish society for people coming from abroad. As a result, the Swedes can show such features as: the tendency to cooperate, balanced collectivism, pragmatism that have developed in Sweden under the influence of pro-immigration policy. However, Sweden could not cope with the migration policy to the severity of immigration, related to the presence of armed conflicts in Europe.

The search for the most effective model become a challenge not only by the European Union, but also individual states. For Sweden, it was not an easy task due to the lack of currently effective solutions for a common migration policy of the European Union. The Kingdom of Sweden, in the absence of common rules, was forced to individual actions.

The case of Sweden has shown that even the rich country, which has a social welfare policy, cannot help everyone. The uncontrolled influx of refugees caused a number of political, social and economic effects. Firstly, it influenced the political preferences of the Swedes and the growing importance of national and anti-immigrant parties. It caused a drop in support for the ruling Social Democratic Party, which under the social policy pressure changed the policy to a less favourable one towards the migrants. Secondly, such a large influx of migrants caused that in a small country, in terms of population, there were less and less funds/means to help everyone. The influx of migrants had therefore economic consequences and impact on the shift of funds from the development policy to the migration policy. The consequences of such government decisions contributed, among others, to the change of attitudes of the Swedes towards migrants.

The above analysis has shown that the search for effective solutions in politics is not easy. Migration is a dynamic process, which requires from those who are in power that they should adapt to the conditions of the specific country, placed in the international context. Otherwise, as it was in the case of Sweden, there was a crisis with which Sweden has to cope alone.

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Abstract

The crisis concerning refugees in a varying degree affects European countries, because despite the competences transferred to the European Community to conduct the common migration and asylum policy, the states retained independence in relation to the application of the integration model. The lack of common legal regulations caused the chaos and the lack of strategies in the situation of the intensification of war activities in the world. It [the lack] also contributed to the uncontrolled growth of influx of refugees, including such countries as Syria and Iraq. The main direction of migration is just a few countries belonging to the EU. Like Sweden. This asymmetry of migration flows contributes to the increasing problems of target countries associated with the need to secure the livelihoods for the migrants who arrived. This article analysis the problem with migration in the Kingdom of Sweden, especially issue like: determinants of migration policy in Sweden, Laws and regulations concerning the refugees in Sweden, the attitude of Swedes to refugees and migrants and the problem of immigration in the programmes of the Swedish political parties.

Polityka Szwecji wobec uchodźców

Kryzys dotyczący uchodźców w różnym stopniu wpływa na państwa europejskie, ponieważ mimo przekazanych Wspólnocie Europejskiej kompetencji do prowadzenia wspólnej polityki migracyjnej i azylowej, państwa zachowały niezależność w stosunku do stosowania modelu integracyjnego. Brak wspólnych uregulowań prawnych spowodował chaos i brak strategii w sytuacji natężenia działań wojennych na świecie. Przyczynił się też do niekontrolowanego wzrostu napływu uchodźców, m.in. z takich państw, jak Syria i Irak. Głównym kierunkiem migracji ludności jest zaledwie kilka państw należących do UE, zwłaszcza Szwecja. Ta asymetria przepływów migracyjnych przyczynia się do narastających problemów państw docelowych związanych z potrzebą zapewnienia przybyłym migrantom bytu. Artykuł podejmuje problem uchodźców w Szwecji, zwłaszcza takich kwestii jak: determinanty polityki migracyjnej Szwecji, regulacje prawne wobec uchodźców, stosunek społeczeństwa do migrantów i uchodźców oraz problem migracji w programach partii politycznych.

Key words

Migration, Sweden,

Słowa kluczowe

Migracja, Szwecja

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