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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND RADICALIZATION OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

Introduction

Post-war immigration in Europe has been a part of the transformation of European societies toward cultural diversity. Immigrants from outside Europe, especially the Muslim minority have begun to be perceived as a threat to national culture and identity, social cohesion and culture of the host country. The discussions have highlighted the problems of creating ethnic ghettos, the immigrants' rejection of culture and language of the country of settlement, lack of employment, permanent dependence on social welfare system, as well as crime and increased susceptibility to Islamic extremism². Following the terrorist attacks and riots caused by immigrants and their descendants in the suburbs of European cities - according to Jolanta Szymańska - the idea of "European openness" has been confronted with "European security". Immigrants from outside the EU, especially the Muslims, have begun to be associated with threats and issues of internal security³.

European countries have become not only the target of terrorist attacks, but also the place, where potential terrorists are recruited, funds for terrorist activities are raised and also the place of propaganda activities aimed at radicalisation in attitudes and behaviour⁴. The influx of immigrants often also leads to the growth of radical, racist, xenophobic sentiments, not accepting multicultural society, among the native

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² Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska, Sławomir Łodziński, „Wprowadzenie”, in: *Problemy integracji imigrantów. Koncepcje, badania, polityki*, eds. Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska, Sławomir Łodziński (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008), 10-11.

³ Jolanta Szymańska, „Obywatelstwo europejskie a problem integracji imigrantów w Unii Europejskiej”, *Studia Politologiczne*, 27 (2013): 207-239.

⁴ According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution of August 2016 - Islamists and Salafists took more than 340 attempts to recruit immigrants to terrorist organization in shelters for asylum seekers. A common phenomenon is also pro-Islamic agitation, aimed at radicalization of religious people staying in shelters for refugees. The place of radicalization are often mosques, while some individuals become radicals on their own or they get instructions for terrorist attacks.

population. Their spectacular and tragic manifestation were the attacks carried out by Andreas Breivik⁵. In the face of the problems associated with intensive influx of migrants to Europe the integration of immigrants into the host society has become a very important issue. OECD has warned recently against the radicalisation of Muslims, which will be difficult to stop if integration programmes are not implemented immediately.

The aim of this article is to attempt to answer the question whether the integration of Muslim minorities can prevent their radicalisation and consequently reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. The starting point for discussion will be the presentation of the concept of integration of immigrants and the experience in the integration of Muslim immigrants. The other parts of the study have been devoted to the causes of radicalisation of Muslims and the role of Islam in Muslim communities. The last part of the article refers to the formulated research question and suggests taking some actions.

Integration concepts and experience

Various European countries have developed different approaches and practices to help immigrants assimilate into the host societies. European countries can be classified as more assimilationist (France), multicultural (UK, the Netherlands, Sweden) and functionalist-pluralist (German and Austrian policy towards guest workers⁶). The assimilationist model demonstrates a lack of tolerance for immigrants' diversity and is criticized as a policy based on the unilateral adaptation process, aiming to eliminate cultures of minorities. In the multicultural model newcomers are allowed to maintain their own identity and cultural practices of the country of origin. Additionally, the immigrants have equal rights in all spheres of the host society and by implication respect its core values. Multiculturalism is now subjected to severe criticism arising from the idea of its ineffectiveness in the integration of immigrants. It is recognized as a too idealistic project or even "a failed experiment"⁷, which has suffered a setback in reducing racism and xenophobia and contributed to the alienation of Diaspora, especially Muslims. The last model of policy reflects the German classical approach of matching immigration to labour market needs. Politics creates temporary solutions in relation to the "guest workers" who return to their countries. The different models of integration policies are certain ideal types, so they are not consequently used in any of the states. Although these typologies of European integration models have been criticized for oversimplification, they still constitute reference point in the debate on policy of immigrant integration⁸.

⁵ Rafał Raczyński, „Wpływ migracji międzynarodowych na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa”, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka* 2 (2015): 17-18.

⁶ Tiziana Caponio, Maren Borkert, "Introduction: the local dimension of migration policymaking", in: *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking*, eds. Tiziana Caponio, Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 15-16.

⁷ Szymańska, *Obywatelstwo*, 207-208.

⁸ Caponio, Borkert, *Introduction*, 13-17.

In the nineties the concept of “integration” gained immense popularity, both in science as a term and concept, and in politics - as “integration policy”. In the concept of the integration of immigrants from outside the EU, currently promoted by the European Commission, the key issue is “a two-way process of adaptation of immigrants, which implies a change not only the values, norms and behaviour of the newcomers, but also members of the host society”⁹. Immigrants, to a greater or lesser extent, retain their cultural difference, because otherwise the process of assimilation takes place. The integration process is to be comprehensive, covering not only the economic and social aspects of life, but also the issues of citizenship, participation in public life and political rights. Fairly widespread opinion about the failure of multiculturalism has led to the conviction that the best way to counter radicalization is strengthening social cohesion and improving the integration of the Muslim population. Western countries have adopted counter-terrorism strategies based on civic integration and inclusive citizenship¹⁰.

Muslim immigrants are not completely homogenous group, they come from different countries, live in different countries, speak different languages, follow different versions of Islam, are more or less moderate in their beliefs and claims. Differences between Muslim communities are often enormous, which indicates the need for different approaches to the integration of Muslims in the West¹¹. In studies on the integration of Muslim communities in the West the existing three typical patterns have been identified¹²: 1) inside integration - integrating on a wider scale within Muslim communities based on the elements of their ethnic origin, culture, common language and country of origin; 2) outside integration – Islamists are seeking to integrate with Muslims in the West, according to one Islamic pattern to create a single Islamic religious community that goes beyond ethnic and cultural differences; 3) integration into their own nation (country of origin), but not into the host society. Although there are many examples of successful integration of Muslims, these typical patterns of integration show the gap between the diaspora Muslim and Western societies. There is a widespread belief that the integration of Muslims in Western societies failed in the socio-economic, civic and cultural and religious fields. The second-generation of immigrants is less educated, has greater difficulty in finding work and poorer housing conditions than native residents and other young immigrants. Anna Triandafyllidou notes that it is difficult to explain why these inequalities persist, and which factors are most important: the socio-

⁹ Sławomir Łodziński, Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska, „Koncepcje, badania i praktyki integracji imigrantów. Doświadczenia polskie w europejskim kontekście”, *Studia Migracyjne – Przegląd Polonijny*, 2 (2011): 20.

¹⁰ Christian Joppke, *The role of the state in cultural integration: trends, challenges, and ways ahead* (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012), 2-3.

¹¹ Anna Triandafyllidou, “European Muslims: Caught between Local Integration Challenges and Global Terrorism Discourses”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper 15 (2015): 7, retrieved 2.08.2016 <http://www.osce.org/networks/166511?download=true>.

¹² Noman Benotman, “Muslim Communities: Between Integration and Securitization”, Quilliam Foundation, retrieved 14.08.2016, <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/283/muslim-communities-between-integration-and-securitization>.

economic background, discrimination, unequal opportunities, religion, specific ethnic origin, the structure of educational system or perhaps a variable combination of all these factors¹³. Integration with host societies is becoming more difficult, since immigrants/refugees are less and less frequently seen as victims and more often as a potential threat to the order and security.

Causes of radicalization

The literature suggests several reasons for the radicalisation of Muslims such as poverty and marginalization, alienation and exclusion related to the failure of integration, threatened identity and the lack of links with the national culture and discrimination. Failure to integrate Muslim immigrants and their second and third generation has become a common explanation of radicalization¹⁴. The failure to integrate Muslim contributes to the creation of a new domain of disintegration, which is used by Islamic extremists as a way to recruit candidates for the jihadists. Extremists use the concept of religion to create a separate Muslim community, whose identity is based on separatist ideas such as “Muslims” and “infidels”¹⁵. Several thousand young people, a small percentage of European Muslim communities joined ISIS to fight in the war of jihad. According to Soufan Group, at the end of 2015 at the side of the Islamic State fought some 28,000 foreign volunteers, of which 5,000 came from Western Europe, including 3.7 thousand from four countries: France (1.7 thousand), the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium. Recruiting these young people by extremist imams or via the Internet is considered evidence of the failure of various models of integration of immigrants in Europe. Radicalized Muslims are most often children and grandchildren of immigrants, which shows that over the years the problem of integration intensifies rather than weakens.

As mentioned before, Western countries have adopted counter-radicalisation strategies firmly based on civic integration. The literature however often indicates lack of sufficient evidence to show that failure to integrate Muslim immigrants in Western societies is the main cause of radicalization¹⁶. Michael Emerson identified three types of radicalisation (actually their causes) occurring in Europe among Muslims after the September 11, 2001¹⁷. The first is inspired by political and religious origins: the jihadist views are based on different interpretations of Islamic texts, which, as it is presumed, call for global violence aimed at overthrowing the

¹³ Triandafyllidou, *European*, 8.

¹⁴ Sadeq Rahimi, Raissa Graumans, “Reconsidering the Relationship Between Integration and Radicalization”, *Journal for Deradicalization* 5 (2015): 32, retrieved 30.07.2016, <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/34>.

¹⁵ Benotman, *Muslim*.

¹⁶ Marco Goli, Shahamak Rezaei, “Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical Inquiry”, *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4 (4) (2011): 104, retrieved 20.07.2016, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.4>.

¹⁷ Michael Emerson, “Introduction and Summary”, in: *Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe. Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities*, ed. Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009), 3-4.

secular and non-Islamic regimes. The second type of radicalization is mainly religious and results in a more radical and violent trends than the first. The third type of radicalisation is more closely related to socio-economic issues (and the feeling of being disadvantaged) faced by young second-generation immigrants¹⁸. Dutch sociologist Ruud Koopmans has rejected a widespread, but in his opinion wrong belief that there is a correlation between discrimination and radicalisation. Hatred of Muslims towards non-Muslims is not a unique phenomenon among Muslim immigrants in Europe. It is even greater in the countries of their origin. The radicalization does not occur first in Europe, but in the Islamic world¹⁹. Mirza Mešić, imam and professor of Islamic culture says that the cause of isolation and resentment of Muslims towards the West in all Islamic countries is the strengthening sense of threat from the powerful and secular West imposing its values on the Muslim world. When asked about their most immediate source of resentment towards the West, Muslims most frequently mention “sexual and cultural promiscuity”; then the “ethical and moral corruption” and “hatred of Muslims”²⁰. For Muslim fundamentalists, Europe is godless and immoral. This is clearly seen in a recent statement of the Islamic State giving the reasons for the hatred of the West²¹.

Sadeq Rahimi and Raissa Graumans highlight the numerous contradictions in the research and theory of radicalisation, which make it difficult to draw conclusions and complicate the development of effective policies. Considering, for example, the issue of religion, some scholars believe that religion plays an important role, or at least it cannot be ignored in the process of radicalization. Others deny that religion plays a role in the processes of radicalization. Another example of differences in opinions, given by these authors, refers to the role of new information and communication technologies, especially the Internet, in the process of radicalisation. According to a more common view, the Internet is a fertile ground for recruiting radicals and an important factor, which facilitates the processes of radicalization. Researchers also express the opposite view according to which the role of the Internet in radicalisation of young people is of little importance, and even protects

¹⁸ Michael Emerson emphasizes that Muslims are sometimes provoked to use violence by far-right groups or political parties.

¹⁹ As cited in: Soeren Kern, “Germany's Turkish-Muslim Integration Problem. "My religion is more important to me than the laws of the land in which I live", retrieved 11.08.2016, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8321/germany-turks-integration>.

²⁰ Mirza Mešić, “The Perception of Islam and Muslims in the Media and the Responsibility of European Muslims Towards the Media”, retrieved 10.08.2016, <http://www.culturelink.org/conf/dialogue/mesic.pdf>.

²¹ ISIS lists the following reasons for its hatred towards the West: 1) first of all a lack of faith, not recognizing Allah as the only God, lack of faith is also the first reason for the fight against the West (“...we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit to the authority of Islam”); 2) liberal, secularist society (“Your secular liberalism has led you to tolerate and even support “gay rights,” to allow alcohol, drugs, fornication, gambling, and usury to become widespread, and to encourage the people to mock those who denounce these filthy sins and vices”; 3) atheism; 4) crimes against Islam; 4) crimes against the Muslims; 5) the invasion of Islamic countries. “Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You”, *Dabiq*, 15 (2016): 30-33.

against it, by providing a “safe” virtual space for expressing frustration and anger²². Sadeq Rahimi and Raissa Graumans rightly conclude that radicalisation is a “*par excellence* contextual phenomenon”, which is affected by global, sociological, political, ideological, psychological factors, historical injustice and colonialism. The authors suggest that “Islamic radicalization, if not altogether unrelated to the question of integration, is certainly not a natural by-product of failed integration”²³. Numerous studies indicate that the real causes and paths of radicalization are diverse and complex.

According to a prominent expert on Islam Olivier Roy: “Radicalized young people (...) are moved to action by the displays of violence in the media of Western culture” (...) they are not involved with the local religious community and the neighborhood mosques. These young people practice self-radicalization on the Internet, searching for a global jihad. (...). In short, they are not seeking the Islamization of the society in which they live but the realization of their sick fantasy of heroism”²⁴. According to Anna Triandafyllidou, these individuals become radicalised for whom declaring for the particular understanding of Islam proposed by ISIS and its supporters is an existential escape. In the author’s opinion, motivations and social mechanisms which make young Muslims become foreign fighters in Syria or engage in international terrorist conspiracies have more in common with the postmodern apathy of young people, which is expressed in religious terrorism²⁵.

Experts say that often lonely and lost people, looking for their place in society become radicalised. Research indicates that it is not possible to determine the typical profile of a radical or extremist. Some of the terrorists were well-integrated into the community, well-educated and had socially valued professions²⁶. Radicals have a different ethnicity, different socioeconomic status, may be derived from the first, second or third generation immigrants or be converts. Profiling people who became radicalised is not then an effective tool for the prevention and identification.

The role of Islam

In the analysis of the issues of integration of Muslim immigrants and the radicalisation of their small group the issue of the Muslim faith cannot be ignored. As a Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan writes: “Islam is first and foremost the

²² Rahimi Graumans, *Reconsidering*, 41-42.

²³ Rahimi Graumans, *Reconsidering*, 48.

²⁴ Olivier Roy, “There Are More French Muslims Working for French Security Than for Al Qaeda”, *The World Post*, 1.09.2015, retrieved 30.07.2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-roy/paris-attack-muslim-cliches_b_6445582.html.

²⁵ Triandafyllidou, *European*, 10-11.

²⁶ Kris Christmann, *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence*, Youth Justice Board of England and Wales, 2012: 31-32, retrieved <http://www.Justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf>.

religion revealed divinely, with the rooted belief in its universal values. It is also a way of life, the concept of life and death, and not only the cultural characteristics of a particular population arriving from countries outside Europe. Therefore, without taking into account the religious dimension, all discussions on various aspects of Islam in Europe (...) will be either groundless or at least inadequate²⁷. For Muslims, Islam is not merely a system of religious worship, but their whole life, the overarching system of values²⁸. Taking no notice of the religious dimension does not allow a proper understanding of the complexity of the problem of radicalization and makes it difficult to find an adequate solution to it²⁹. Islamic reformer Sultan Shahin, says: "For hundreds of years now, the leading Muslim theologians have been involved in creating a coherent and comprehensive theology of supremacy, intolerance and violence in order to extend the reach of Islam. They have definitively made a lower form of jihad, i.e. battling, compulsory for all healthy Muslims. (...). If our madrasa and educational institutions will continue to prepare the ground for separating and militancy (...) Islam will continue to be shackled, it will be still difficult for Muslims to fit into the way of life in the modern world"³⁰.

Graeme Wood, a Canadian journalist and lecturer at Yale University argues that "The religion [Islam - LR] allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose". He suggests that the opponents of the Islamic State should lead to issuing the proclamation that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid³¹. Monika G. Bartoszewicz notes that despite the fact that ISIS is a model religious persecutor - the vast majority of Western studies and strategies "completely ignore the political theology of ISIS. This is done in two ways: religious character of ISIS is either ignored, or it is diminished, as it is claimed that the organization "annexed" or "abuses" or "misinterprets" the peaceful message of Islam"³². The author points out that, with this approach, the West will not manage to cope with threats, because it is not able to identify the sources of conflict properly, not to mention their prevention. She also believes that only after the recognition of the religious inspiration of the Islamic State it is possible to appeal to Muslim scholars and opinion leaders "to take decisive action against the

²⁷ Tariq Ramadan, "Europeanization of Islam Or Islamization of Europe", in: *Islam, Europe's Second Religion. The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 207 – 208, as cited in: Ryszard M. Machnikowski, *Muzułmanie w Europie Zachodniej – między integracją a radykalizacją* (Warszawa: Centrum Europejskie Natolin, 2010), 62.

²⁸ Jerzy Guź, *Muzułmanie w Niemczech – lojalni obywatele państwa, „społeczeństwo równoległe” czy baza dla terroryzmu islamskiego. Wprowadzenie do zagadnienia*, Biblioteka Cyfrowa Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, retrieved 10.08.2016, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/Content/42415/015.pdf>.

²⁹ Machnikowski, *Muzułmanie*, 31.

³⁰ Sultan Szahin, *Przemówienie indyjskiego reformatora*, retrieved 12.08.2016, <https://www.oximity.com/article/Przem%C3%B3wieni-e-indyjskiego-reformat-1>.

³¹ Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants", *The Atlantic*, March 2015, retrieved 6.08.2016, www.theatlantic.com.

³² Monika G. Bartoszewicz, *Wojny kultur. Islamski problem Europy*, retrieved 6.08.2016, <https://euroisl.am.pl/wojny-kultur-islamski-problem-europy/>.

interpretation of Islam, which is followed by the Islamic State. This is necessary because the Muslims (not only in the West) seem to be confused when it comes to the question what exactly are theological mistakes ISIS makes³³. Benedict XVI was right to claim that using public dialogue Islam needs to explain its attitude to violence and to reason³⁴.

Conclusion

The analysis provides a basis for concluding that the actions for the integration of Muslim immigrants into European societies should not be regarded as the only effective way to counter radicalisation. The experience shows that interventions and measures applied on the basis of a negative correlation between integration and radicalisation (the more the integration the less the radicalisation) often turn out ineffective and the problem of radicalisation is growing³⁵. Therefore, it is worth considering taking various measures to solve the problems and improve safety, including: 1) immediate reduction of the mass influx of immigrants and subjecting it to better control; 2) finding alternative ways to assist migrant population from the Middle East and North Africa; 3) effective integration policy; 4) maintaining close positive relationship with the Muslim community so that the efforts of law enforcement agencies in European countries could result in increased security; 5) deradicalisation; 6) cooperation of Muslims and Christians in order to put an end to terrorism; 7) forced deportation of persons involved in terrorist activities; 8) application and enforcement of the law of the host country, rather than implementing elements of Islamic law –sharia in Europe; 9) departing from the so-called political correctness, providing reliable identification of problems and their sources in order to find effective solutions. There is a strong need for thorough analysis regarding the recruitment and pathways of transforming a young person into a warrior of jihad and reliable tests that can explain the complex relationship between integration and the radicalisation of Muslim immigrants.

Numerous studies indicate a sharp rise in influence of radical Islamic groups³⁶. The phenomenon of re-Islamization has emerged among young Muslims. According to Anna Rusinek, as far as the second and third generation Muslims are concerned, “while national identity and ethnic identification have weakened, religious identity has become stronger”, as “being a follower of Islam is seen as more prestigious than

³³ Bartoszewicz, *Wojny*.

³⁴ *Światłość świata. Benedykt XVI w rozmowie z Peterem Seewaldem*, trans. Piotr Napiwodzki (Kraków: Znak, 2011), 109.

³⁵ Rahimi, Graumans, *Reconsidering*, 30.

³⁶ Guź, *Muzułmanie*, 213. One of the most dynamic and fastest growing Islamic movements in the Islamic world is the Tablighi Jamaat, which calls on Muslims to return to orthodox Sunni Islam and get completely separated from the non-Muslim majority.

originating from a particular country”³⁷. Pope Benedict XVI in an interview with Peter Seewald (*Światłość świata. Benedykt XVI w rozmowie z Peterem Seewaldem*) explains this phenomenon as follows: Muslims seeing the moral crisis of the West, its deep contradictions and weakening the significance of Christian religion – have begun to consider Islam as a more vital religion than Christianity and the religion of the future. Sense of pride, which is the source of Muslims’ strength has sharpened. The aforementioned Mirza Mesic says that for many young Muslims, Islam seems to be a substitute for their homeland, which is not found in the societies in which they live³⁸. Recent studies conducted by researchers at the University of Münster indicate that of the three million Turks living in Germany, twenty percent think that "the threat which the West poses to Islam justifies violence" and seven percent believe that “violence is justified to spread Islam” - 7% of the 3 million Turks living in Germany means 210,000 people who consider jihad an admissible method of promoting Islam³⁹.

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³⁷ Anna Rusinek, *Zrozumieć terrorystę... Dlaczego niektórzy muzułmanie w Europie radykalizują się*, in: *Zachód a świat islamu – Zrozumieć Innego*, eds. Izabela Kończak, Marta Woźniak (Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki, 2012), 66.

³⁸Mirza Mešić, *The Perception*.

³⁹Kern, *Germany’s*.

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Abstract

Failure to integrate Muslim immigrants and their second and third generation has become a common explanation of radicalisation. This article attempts to answer the question whether the integration of Muslim minorities can be an effective way to counter the radicalisation and consequently reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. The analysis has led to the conclusion that the integration measures should not be considered as the only way to counter radicalization, which threatens safety.

Integracja a radykalizacja imigrantów muzułmańskich w Europie

Powszechnym wyjaśnieniem radykalizacji stało się postrzegane niepowodzenie w integracji przybyszów muzułmańskich oraz ich drugiej i trzeciej generacji. Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy integracja mniejszości muzułmańskich może być skutecznym sposobem przeciwdziałania ich radykalizacji a w konsekwencji zmniejszyć ryzyko ataków terrorystycznych. W konkluzji stwierdzono, że działania integracyjne nie powinny być uznane jako jedyny sposób przeciwdziałania radykalizacji zagrażającej bezpieczeństwu.

Key words

Integration, radicalisation, Muslim immigrants.

Słowa kluczowe

Integracja, radykalizacja, muzułmańscy imigranci.

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