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**The Arctic and Nordic
Countries in the World of Economy and Politics**

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**RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC.
FACTORS, INSTRUMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

In the course of the last 20 years, the role of the Arctic in global policy evolved from being a peripheral region into an area of both intense competition and a laboratory for dialogue and cooperation. Arctic Region forms crossroads of vital interests of Russia and other Arctic states. At the same time, the Arctic attracts attention of several non-arctic states² interested in its resources, chiefly hydrocarbons. Thus, ongoing de-provincionalization of the Arctic requires creation of a new platform for international cooperation. The so called 'Arctic question' is ever more intensively discussed in Russia. Concerning both country's geographical position and rising activity of its potential partners and possible competitors, development of this region urges the political elite as well as experts and academia to deal with this complex and uncertain problem. Russia is nowadays confronted with necessity of defining its own strategy towards the Arctic, finding operational instruments to implement it and assuming possible consequences in its relations with other partners also present in the region.

From Russia's perspective, Arctic region has a very special characteristics. For Russia, the Arctic constitutes both internal and foreign aspect of its policy. Taking into consideration the fact, that large part of Russian territory is classified as belonging to Arctic region and even more is organically oriented towards it due to the geographical relief and communications, Arctic policy, unlike Russia's policy

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² Such non-Arctic states as Great Britain, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand already voiced their interest.

in more distant parts of the world, directly touches Russia's strategic and economic interests. The Arctic demonstrates a paradox of interdependence between internal and external aspect of Russia's policy. It is impossible to pursue an active policy in that region without dealing with foreign partners while at the same time, trying to activate the external aspect stimulates internal problems. Any foreign activity within that space automatically becomes an issue in Russia's internal political life. Taking into consideration this fragility, one should note that the main cause of long-lasting marginalization of the Arctic in Russian political life as well as lack of effectiveness of its strategy towards the region was the absence of policy driving force which could possibly be the State represented by ministries and federal agencies, regional authorities or business companies.

Unlike other geopolitically sensitive regions of Russia (ex. North Caucasus, Russian Far East), Arctic has not been regrouped into one specific administrative entity, a «subject of Federation». That is why, Russia's policy towards the Arctic must be seen as a wide plethora of activities of central government, specified federal agencies, regional authorities and business. This activity is not coordinated, chaotic and often contradictory. Given the wide range of actors, it is hardly possible to identify one definite and coordinated strategy. Thus, it is more relevant to define Russia's activity in Arctic region as a proto-strategy or meta-strategy.

Factors stimulating Russia's activity towards the Arctic may be divided into two groups: objective and subjective. The first one is a result of geographic position and cannot be modified or stimulated by the state itself. The second group is a result of deliberately chosen policies and as such is a consequence of strategic choice made by Russian government and other actors able to influence it.

Geographic and climatic factor lays down basic coordinates of state policy. Climate change and acceleration of ice melting stimulate the rise of states' activity and interest. Rising international interest in the Arctic was highly stimulated by the publication of the results of climate research in polar areas, that clearly testifies the amplification of ice melting process³. According to the expertise, during the 21st century temperature growth in Arctic will by twofold exceed an average global warming for the whole Planet⁴. As a result, the ice cover of the Arctic Ocean constantly shrinks, and economic activity in this region becomes more attractive and potentially profitable, especially given results of technological progress being at disposal.

But in this case, the environmental factor also plays an increasing role. Already in 1989, Finland proposed to hold a regional conference devoted to the environment protection. Finland has initiated a strategy of environmental protection that lately evolved into 'Rovaniemi process'⁵. The following conferences in

³ According to results of research of Russian Geographical Society, area of arctic ice diminished by 8% since 1978. According to other research, between 1970 and 2010, area of ice in Arctic shrank by 40%. See: *Арктика как индикатор изменения климата в мире*: <http://www.rgo.ru/2010/04/arktika-kak-indikator-izmeneniya-klimata-v-mire/>.

⁴ ACIA: *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, Cambridge 2005.

⁵ А. Овлащенко, *Формирование Арктической политики ЕС*, „МЭ и МО”, no. 7, 2009.

Greenland (1993) and Inuvik (1996) created a path for the development of cooperation within the Arctic Council.

Analysis of Russian strategy can not underestimate historic factor. Since it became an empire, Russia has always remained present in European and Asian North. Being present and able to pursue an active policy in this region is widely regarded as a indispensable component of Russian statehood. Russia's mastering started with founding of Arkhangelsk in 1584 – an important trade hub and military bridgehead⁶. The first official document declaring Russian protectorate over the land and islands between its sovereign territory and the North Pole was a diplomatic note of Imperial Foreign Ministry of September 20th, 1916. Russian Arctic sector layed between the 32th and the 168th meridian east of Greenwich. All claims were confirmed under the new regime by the Statement of the Presidium of Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15th, 1926 defining Soviet sector as the biggest of all national sectors – 5,842 square kilometers⁷. Soviet Union established its national maritime traffic regime and exclusive economic zone by the Order of the Supreme Council in 1984.

The strategic factor, widely seen as a fundamental drive of Russia's activity towards the Arctic is the first among subjective factors of its strategy. Given basic geographical characteristics, the northern stretegic dimension is seen as vital to assure national security and guarantee teritorial integrity. Moreover, it is important to note that Arctic has a substantive conflict potential⁸. For a long time, it has remained the most important strategic space of direct contact between the USSR and NATO countries. ABM systems, radar stations, airports and anti-aircraft rockets were located in Arctic parts of the Soviet Union as well as USA, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Danmark (Greenland)⁹. The Arctic comprised a land piece of the border between NATO and the USSR in Northern Norway (around Kirkenes). The maritime border between NATO and the USSR contained a piece in the Barents Sea and Bering Straight. During the Cold War, the Arctic was considered by both sides not only as a strategically crucial area but also as a potential war zone that provoked race for control and development of maritime and air bases

⁶ Northern territories played important role during Northern War, Napoleonic Wars, Crimean War (when Solovky Monastery and Kola Peninsula were attacked by Anglo – French fleet), Entente intervention against Bolsheviks in 1918 – 1920 and Soviet operations against Wehrmacht during the WW II.

⁷ О.В. Александров, *Северный вектор внешней политики России: внешняя политика России на Балтике, в регионе Северной Европы и в Арктике*, Спутник, Москва 2012, p. 146.

⁸ Until now, certain economic assets wait for division as well as economic zone in Bering Sea that has not been settled. The so called Baker – Shevardnadze Line has not been accepted by Russia nor ratified by Russian Parliament. Russia as well as several other countries discuss the shape of economic zone around Spitsbergen, there remains a conflict between Russia and Denmark and Canada over the underwater Lomonosov Ridge.

⁹ See more: А.Г. Арбатов, *Арктика и стратегическая стабильность* [in:] *Арктика: зона мира и сотрудничества*, ed. А.В. Загорский, Москва 2011.

and all kinds of military systems¹⁰. The Arctic was also home to one of the strongest and well organized Soviet fleets: the Northern Fleet. Its arsenal consisted of submarine and ballistic missile carriers as well as strong air wing¹¹.

The Arctic has also played an important role as an object of scientific research, itself also highly politicised and militarised during the Cold War. Its history was full of Soviet success and is seen as a source of pride, state strength and prestige of national science. The USSR has been the only Arctic state, that maintained continuous research in Arctic region, established research stations, created a fleet of icebreakers, made the first flight over the North Pole.

However nowadays, it is the economic factor that seems to prevail over strategic one and determines military presence. Results of numerous surveys prove, that among all macro-regions of the world, the Arctic remains one of the richest in resources. According to unofficial prognosis, the Arctic may contain up to a quarter of World oil and gas stock¹². According to the available data, Arctic shelf contains 7% of proved oil reserves and up to 25% of proved natural gas reserves. There are also concentrated ores of copper, nickel, lead, platinum, rare metals, gold, diamonds, tungsten, mercury, ferrous metals and others¹³. Majority of those deposits are located on-shore. It is important to note, that for Russia, the Arctic has relatively greater significance, due to the fact, that Arctic zone contains 60% of Russian oil and 95% of Russian gas reserves¹⁴. Resources in the Arctic are not equally spread. The Russian sector is the most affluent and contains up to 74 billion barrels of oil and up to 44 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. As far as the Russian fields are concerned the most convenient for extraction are those located on the Barents Sea shelf, the Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea¹⁵. This fact has both internal and external dimension. At home, Russia's economy suffers from lack of energy efficiency. Abroad, since the first term of Vladimir Putin, Russia elaborated and started implementing its strategy of using energy resources as an instrument of achieving political goals. Making this policy efficient and long-lasting stipulates, that Russia is supposed to control a critical share of World's energy resources. This includes extraction, transportation and distribution of those.

¹⁰ USA mounted on Alaska three army bases, three air bases, three bases of coast guard. On Chukotka Peninsula, USSR dislocated a motorized division trained for fighting in Arctic conditions.

¹¹ For details see: *Soviet Military Power*, Washington, 1990.

¹² 58% of off-shore resources are grouped here, compared to 19% under Atlantic Ocean, 17% Indian and 6% under Pacific, See: Е.А. Телегина, *Ресурсы Арктического региона: перспективы и проблемы их освоения* [in:] *Арктика: зона мира и сотрудничества*, ed. А.В. Загорский, Москва 2011.

¹³ List of resources present in Arctic: <http://www.arktika-antarktida.ru/arktikapolsk.shtml>

¹⁴ *Russian Oil and Gas Fields in the Arctic* (CIA data), „The Moscow Times”, no. 80, 2011.

¹⁵ At the same time, Canadian reserves are estimated at 33 billion barrels and 2 trillions of cubic meters, American – 28 billion of barrels and 7 trillion cubic meters. See: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/S/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010pdf; See also: United States Geological Survey, July 2008, <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf> (undiscovered resources of the Arctic).

Given the amount of resources the Arctic contains, losing control of it would destabilize laboriously achieved position of global energy balancer. As a whole, the dispersion of estimations of Arctic resources remains high which is due to insufficient survey as well as to growing information campaigns aiming to manipulate this question by diminishing or amplifying supposed gains from exploitation.

Another Arctic resource waiting for management is its potential in communications. Russia as a legal successor of the Soviet Union, disposes of the longest Arctic coast of 22600 km length while total coastline of Arctic states is 38700 km. Possible transportation corridors in the Arctic may become an alternative for traditional intercontinental routes attached to highly instable regions¹⁶. It is worth noting, that already during WW II, more than 4.5 million tons of cargo were transported to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease Act through Arctic corridors¹⁷. Nowadays, two routes of global significance are available in the Arctic: the Northern Sea Route going along the north coast of the Russian territory, and the Northwest Passage that links the Atlantic with the Pacific and is located amidst the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Russia has tried to follow Canadian example and introduce *faits accomplis* by unilateral actions in the part of the Arctic considered as under national sovereignty. In 1998 Federal Act on «Internal Maritime Waters, Territorial Sea and Adjacent Zone» was adopted. It states that transportation by Northern Sea Route is «historically formed national communication of Russian Federation in Arctic that will be exploited according to Federal Law»¹⁸. This clearly defines the Northern Sea Route as exclusively Russian transportation corridor and enables it to establish control over transit circuits including cross-polar air ways¹⁹. However, the Act undermines the realization of Russia's strategy due to the fact that the federal body vested with power to regulate the traffic was not been clearly defined and thus suffers from lack of international legitimacy. As a result USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Japan and others dispute Russian jurisdiction over it and advocate its internationalization²⁰.

The list of instruments of Russian strategy in the Arctic should correspond with legal instruments which, for the time being, are widely seen as a main obstacle for

¹⁶ Middle East (Suez and Bab-el-Mandeb), Persian Gulf (Straight of Ormuz), Central America (Panama Canal) and Indian Ocean (Straight of Malacca). Difference in sailing time between Northern Sea Route and Suez Canal is 10 days. Distance between Hamburg and Yokohama through the former is 12,000 km, while through Suez – 20,500 km.

¹⁷ В. Зимонин, *Ленд-лиз: как это было*, „Красная Звезда”, 26.10.2006.

¹⁸ Федеральный закон, *О внутренних морских водах, территориальном море и прилегающей зоне Российской Федерации*, 31.07.1998, Информационно – правовой портал Гарант, <http://base.garant.ru/12112602/>.

¹⁹ According to certain expert prognosis, by the middle of the 21st Century, up to 75% of World air traffic will be effectuated over the Arctic, see: Е. Никитин, *Через Северный полюс в Америку. И обратно*, http://www.trud.ru/article/06-02-2001/19116_cherez_severnyj_poljus_v_ameriku_i_obratno/print.

²⁰ It is important to note, that demographic factor may play its role. With 9 million inhabitants regrouped in 70 towns, 360 villages and 1300 little settlements in Arctic and Subarctic region Russia surpasses all other Arctic states by demographic presence in the region.

the realization of development projects in the Arctic. This is possible due to the fact, that its legal status has not been internationally defined. This lack of regime prolongates territorial conflicts, that disturb economic development as massive investment remains too risky under legal and political uncertainty but also makes it possible to use legal instruments as a political weapon.

Given the fact that interests of numerous international organizations clash in the Arctic, it would be more efficient for Russia to introduce and use institutional instruments. This includes dealing with and within global ones, (United Nations), regional organizations and forums (NATO, European Union, Arctic Council), subregional (Council of Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Council of Ministers of Northern Countries). A serious impulse for post-bipolar structurization of the Arctic as politically significant space was done by founding of the Arctic Council in 1996²¹.

Under the pressure provoked by Russian expedition in 2007 and publications of estimates concerning natural resources, in 2008 a new body– the Arctic Five was established, (five referring to member countries- Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and USA). Not all members of the Arctic Council were invited to the first meeting in Greenland's Ilulissat (Jakobshavn), limiting the presence to those having the access to the Arctic Ocean. Unlike Arctic Council, The Five declared its ambition to become a discussion platform to solve political problems tied to Arctic region. The environmental implications of natural resources extraction were discussed. Leaving environmental and development problems to the Arctic Council, the Arctic Five members declared their exclusive competence to deal with all questions linked to presumable energy exploitation. The main argument was that only those countries are vested with polar territories and economic zones in the Arctic Ocean²². This shows that nowadays, technological, social and economic effectiveness as well as military instruments rather than legal and institutional tools will form mainstream of nascent framework of interaction.

That's why the analysis of political instruments becomes crucial for revealing Russian strategy. Russia's policy in the Arctic has been going several stages. During the 1990s, as it demonstrated passivity in governing its Arctic territories, cut state economic activity and support for private companies troubled by high cost of activity due to hard climate conditions, the political factor of Russia's strategy in the Arctic practically did not exist. As a result massive out-migration took place creating an effect of Russia's geoeconomic shrinking from the North and East to the Center. After major political shift from Yeltsin to Putin, since the

²¹ See: Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council, September 19, 1996, <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ru/about/documents/file/13-ottawa-declaration>.

²² See: Выступление Президента России Д.А. Медведева на заседании Совета Безопасности РФ по вопросам изменения климата, 17.03.2010, <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/news/7125>. The Russo – Canadian controversy was conciliated by Norway, and finally, The Arctic Five decided to effectuate tighter cooperation in emergency situations liquidation as well as its adherence to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, that limits the exclusive economic zone to 200 sea miles.

2000s, the Arctic became one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. This change was stimulated by several factors: the publication of data confirming giant resource potential, meteorological survey testifying climate change. This prognosis stimulated interest of other Arctic states as well as big transnational companies which forced Russian political elite to focus their attention on the Arctic, especially in defining Russian borders in the region. For the first time in history, Russia did define its Arctic strategy and revealed the means of its implementation²³. In addition to external competition, this was stimulated by consolidation of energy factor in Russian foreign policy, construction of new export gas and oil pipelines and transportation projects in the Russian North²⁴. In September 2008, Security Council of Russian Federation defined Arctic as a perspective basis for Russian economics and Russian President claimed that Russia should be considered as 'Arctic superpower'²⁵. According to D. Medvedev, Russia will form normative basis, regulate state activity and strengthen borders of continental shelf as well as diminish disproportions of development between Arctic territories and other regions. The former rush in defining Russian borders, denial of sectoral principle as well as Soviet legal basis concerning Arctic is widely seen as a political mistake limiting Russia's ability to control its Arctic sector and thus confirm its status of great power and crucial player in this region²⁶. However, between 2007 and 2010 experts saw certain evolution of Russian policy towards greater search for compromise with its partners and acting within international legal framework²⁷. This can be partially explained by the result of the presidential campaign in 2008, which, however might tend to reverse after 2012 elections. As Russian request was rejected, the final is expected by December 2013, when the UN Commission on Shelf is expected to make their final decision concerning the distribution of the unexplored reserves in the Arctic.

Bearing in mind the substantial strategic potential of Arctic states, it is important to reveal the significance and usefulness of military instrument in the Russian Arctic strategy. Russia regards ongoing militarization of the Arctic as highly negative factor, especially with unilateral actions of individual states (such as deployment of elements of US missile defence) or within multilateral formats excluding Russia (within NATO). As stated by the CIC of Russian Navy, admiral

²³ The turning point was posing request to the UN Commission on the Border of Arctic Shelf in 2001 when Russia claimed extension of its shelf up to 1,2 million square kilometers, beyond its 200-miles wide economic zone. Arguments were based on geological singularities confirmed by expeditions in 2005, 2007 and 2010. See: В.Д. Каминский, *Широкомасштабные геологоразведочные работы ВНИИОкеангеология с борта атомохода „Россия” по проблеме внешней границы континентального шельфа России в Арктике*, „Проблемы Арктики и Антарктики”, no. 2, 2009.

²⁴ Such as Baltic Pipeline System completed in 2001 or Nordstream completed in 2011.

²⁵ Заседание Совета безопасности, *О защите национальных интересов России в Арктике*, 17.09.2008, <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/news/1434>.

²⁶ Ю.Ф. Лукин, *Великий передел Арктики*, Архангельск 2010.

²⁷ See: E. W. Rowe, *Russia's Northern Policy: Balancing an 'Open' and 'Closed' North*, „Russian Analytical Digest”, 12.05.2011.

V.Vysotskyi during Collegium of Russian Naval Commission in April 2008, 'today we see peace and stability in the Arctic. However, one should not rule out the fact that border rearrangement of Arctic space by force is possible in the future, including military intervention'²⁸. In response to those anxieties, the Naval Doctrine of Russian Federation establishes aim of strengthening Russia's position among Arctic powers to be able to contain possible danger²⁹. Following those statements, Russia started active practical steps to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic. This includes renewal of icebreakers fleet and construction of 15 new icebreakers apt to secure Russia's Arctic border³⁰. The Representatives of the General Staff (gen. Vladimir Shamanov) confirmed that Russian Army is ready to protect 1,2 square kilometres of its Arctic shelf³¹. At the same time, Russia stands for the adoption of international convention on the ban of militarization of the Arctic as well as ban on military maneuvers on its territory that would deprive NATO of possibility to use Arctic waters. NATO's activity is officially seen as a threat to Russian security³². Russia also fears Sweden and Finland joining NATO³³.

As state policy, not only in Russia, is often stimulated by national or transnational energy companies³⁴, it is important to note the significance of economic instrument in Russian Arctic strategy. Some of Russian big companies present in the Arctic are state owned and the other actively search state support to pursue investments in the region. It's worth noticing, that in this domain, the period of the 1990s contrasted with the late Soviet period, when the USSR effectuated massive geological research and financed scientific and exploratory institutes coupled with Arctic region³⁵. However, successively reborn after 2000, compared to other Arctic countries actively pursuing offshore drilling and establishing maps of their Arctic sectors, so-called 'Arctic expansion' of Russia started in 2007 has got political and informational rather than practical results. Moscow has not yet started any serious research or exploitation of the Arctic

²⁸ В. Воронов, *Северный флот*, „Профиль”, no. 12, 2009.

²⁹ See: *Морская доктрина Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года*, <http://www.mil.ru>.

³⁰ Nowadays Russian fleet contains of four twin-reactor icebreakers: Rossyia, Yamal, Sovetskyi Souyz, 50 lyet Pobedy, two single-reactor ones: Taymyr, Vaygach, atomic light container carrier Sevmorput and five floating service bases.

³¹ This forces formed on the basis of forces located in Leningrad, Syberian and Far-Eastern Military District, patrolling of Arctic space will be effectuated by two strategic rocket carriers Tu-95. In addition, Arctic Group of Border Troops was formed, later transformed into FSB Arctic Regional Border Command which includes border control with Finland and Norway.

³² See: *Морская доктрина Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года*, *op.cit.*

³³ О.В. Александров, *Северный вектор внешней политики России: внешняя политика России на Балтике, в регионе Северной Европы и в Арктике*, Москва 2012, p. 166.

³⁴ This includes Gazprom, Rosneft, Total, Statoil, Conoco Philips, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and BP.

³⁵ Since 1993 Russia ceased geological research on its continental shelf. All openings of Arctic oil and gas fields refer to second half of 1980s. Between 1991 and 2001 no drifting station worked (the last Soviet station 'Severnyi Polyus -31' was closed in June 1991) and for a decade Russia ceased watch on drifting ice in Arctic. Only in 2001 new experimental drifting station 'Severnyi Polyus' was opened, replaced in 2009 by 'Severnyi Polyus - 37'.

sector claimed to be its own. Practical results are not enough to support claims for extension of continental shelf due to the fact that proofs needed by the UN Commission may be acquired only by deep drilling³⁶. This is the main obstacle to Russia's economic expansion, that conditions its claims on legal level: the state does not have special ships apt to carry out deep drilling operations. Such ships exist in the USA, Japan and Great Britain, but due to political motivation stimulated by the competition in Arctic, they are not available for charter³⁷. According to the statement of the minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation Y. Trutnev 'Seismic and drilling exploration maturity of the Russian shelf is tens and hundreds of times lower than the exploration maturity of waters off the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom'³⁸. The main reason for the inactivity of Russian companies in exploring Arctic resources is high prime cost and difficult climatic conditions. According to some experts, prime cost of barrel of oil developed from Russian continental shelf is not less than 70 dollars³⁹. According to International Energy Agency, Russia is supposed to invest 374 billion dollars until 2030⁴⁰.

In their efforts to change this situation, Russian companies, assisted by the state were supposed to become the main instruments of Russian expansion in the Arctic. In 2007 Gazprom, Rosneft and Zarubezhneft received an official invitation from Federal authorities to develop Arctic shelf. The first two were exempted from taxes and allowed to engage foreign partners of their own choice⁴¹.

Knowing the main drives behind Russia's efforts to step up its exploration of the Arctic and the instruments used to make it real, it is important to analyze international implications of Russian activity in the region. Interactions with other states and non-governmental actors demonstrated that given rising and inevitable activity in the region and increasing role of Arctic in global politics, two possible scenarios are likely to be realized: cooperative or confrontational.

In case the cooperative scenario is implemented it may be based on such format as 'Northern Cooperation', 'Northern Dimension', cooperation within Arctic Council, 'Arctic Five', sub-regional forums or bilateral consultations. Russia perceives the output of the cooperation with partners in Northern Dimension as

³⁶ А.В. Кукушкина, В.Н. Шишкин, *Арктика: охрана окружающей среды при добыче углеводородов (международно – правовые аспекты)*, Москва 2010.

³⁷ As a result, Russia, who started exploring Arctic shelf in the same time as Norway (late 1980s), has not yet started exploitation of hydrocarbons, while Norway during 20 years exploited more than 250 million tonnes, See: Ю.Ф. Лукин, *Великий передел Арктики*, Архангельск 2010.

³⁸ Ю.П. Трутнев, *О повышении эффективности освоения углеводородных ресурсов континентального шельфа Российской Федерации*, Минеральные ресурсы российского шельфа, Специальный выпуск 2006.

³⁹ С. Куликов, *Арктическая нефть окажется „золотой“*, „Независимая газета“, 28.01.2011.

⁴⁰ В.В. Васильев, М.А. Жуков, А.В. Истомин, В.С. Селин, *Оценка условий и перспектив использования природных ресурсов неразграниченных морских пространств в Арктической зоне*, Апатиты, Кольский научный центр 2007.

⁴¹ Е. А. Телегина, *Ресурсы Арктического региона: перспективы и проблемы их освоения*, [in:] *Арктика: зона мира и сотрудничества*, ed. А.В. Загорский, Москва 2011.

very positive. Especially the realization of projects concerning the environment protection, utilization of nuclear waste, revitalization of former military bases and its use for commercial and research purposes. Russia counts on rapprochement with Northern European states, especially realization of common projects within the Barents Sea Council such as common management of the Northern Sea Route as well as on the rise of technical cooperation with a possible chance to extend it to other domains (economic, strategic) and other regions. It is important to see positive side effect of international cooperation to the whole of Russia's North, namely the development of transportation and revitalization of towns and villages. This would create a chance of attracting settlers, which might prevent those regions from becoming uninhabited. But to make it real, a new quality of partnership and innovative formats of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be worked out.

Although undesirable for Russia, the realization of confrontational scenario of international interaction must not be excluded. Russia is highly concerned with the increasing impact of non-Arctic countries, especially, British position in favour of Canada and growing activity of China constructing its own icebreakers fleet⁴². Russia's anxiety concerns also possible policy of Iceland, Sweden and Finland – members of the Arctic Council as well as gaining increased autonomy by Greenland and its possible more assertive engagement in regional affairs.

Russia is alarmed by the declarations of the EU and NATO on implementing their respective policies in Arctic region. Russia expresses its deep concern over declarations by NATO representatives⁴³ that the Alliance intends to become a negotiation platform for all Arctic states as well as secure transportation and to organize emergency aid and evacuation. NATO is ready to secure the maritime traffic on the Arctic routes. The deepest concern is connected with the fact, that NATO is ready to guarantee energy security in Arctic region, that has been widely discussed since the 2009 Bucharest Summit. Russia fears intensification of NATO activity in the region and tends to see it as a part of US-led activity, which ignores Russian interests.

Russia is highly concerned with possible competition for resources with the European Union, which transforms its external activity into more coherent action⁴⁴. From Russia's point of view, more active EU policy in the Arctic seems to break the logics of previous policy in this region and moreover considers it as

⁴² It is important to acknowledge, that main object of Chinese research is exploitation and transportation of resources including using of North Sea Route. China opened a research station at Spitzbergen and several times sent its ice breaker on missions in Arctic Ocean. China acts for internationalization of Arctic, free access to its transportation capabilities and exploitation of resources. In those domains, China finds powerful allies among states from all over the world, such as Germany, India, Brazil, South Korea and Japan.

⁴³ See for example: NATO weekly press briefing, 14.01.2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_50111.htm?selectedLocale=en; Speech by the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North, 29.01.2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_50077.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁴⁴ *Climate change may spark conflict with Russia, EU told*, „Guardian”, 10.03.2008.

breaking of partnership commitments between the EU and Russia within Northern Dimension framework⁴⁵. Considering the fact that three of the EU member states are members of the Arctic Council and six of them are the observers, Russia seems to be uneasy with the rising role of the EU, which has gained the observer status itself. The EU may voice the interests of its non-Arctic but otherwise powerful members and thus weaken Russia's position. Russia was disturbed by growing ambitions already voiced by the European Commission in 2008⁴⁶ as well as by its practical instruments such as construction of research Aurora Borealis ice-breaker or using space navigation system Galileo to monitor Arctic spaces as well as financial support to Greenland. Russia is worried with the part of the statement that claims that ecological change involves geostrategic evolution, which in turn may influence global stability and European security⁴⁷. Russia is quite anxious about such intensification especially with regards to exploitation of oil, gas and fish resources⁴⁸. For Russia, this means gaining autonomy and representation of its non-Arctic members⁴⁹. The possible points of disagreement are as follows: exploitation of natural resources on Arctic shelf, including legal framework of activity, strict ecological standards of exploitation, ban on the use of tankers and large ships that do not meet EU environmental standards which it tends to establish as exemplary. Another fear is caused by an attempt to play the role of arbiter in the matter of natural resources exploitation, especially with widely used in EU documents notion of 'sustainable exploitation of energy resources' and 'ecological security standards' which may create possibility to blame Russia for not meeting them. Russia is also concerned by EU demand for 'open and equal access' to resources which is seen as an attempt to claim resources located beyond exclusive economic zones of EU member states. The most controversial and potentially conflict issue is caused by the position of the EU fostering the internationalization of the Arctic, which directly contradicts Russian position and undermines national interests. Russia tends to influence the EU by stimulating the position of its Arctic members and wishes EU Arctic Strategy to pay more attention to cooperation with Russia as well as giving more voice to EU Arctic states in the process of working out common foreign policy⁵⁰.

⁴⁵ During a long period, the EU stayed passive and did not elaborate its Arctic policy. The Northern Dimension was more devoted to Baltic region and Northern Europe and did not apply to problems of Arctic such as division of the Arctic shelf, environment protection and other questions.

⁴⁶ The European Union and the Arctic Region, Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament and The Council, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0763:EN:NOT>.

⁴⁷ EU declares necessity of elaboration and implementation of its Arctic policy including resource management and taking part in multilateral governance in Arctic as well as division of the shelf.

⁴⁸ В. Гулевич, *Арктический вопрос во внешней политике ЕС*, <http://ru-fr.interaffairs.ru/read.php?item=7833>.

⁴⁹ See: Declaration of The European Parliament, EU must not miss the arctic train, January 2011, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110120IPR121003/html/EU-must-not-miss-the-Arctic-train>.

⁵⁰ О.В. Александров, *Северный вектор внешней политики России: внешняя политика России на Балтике, в регионе Северной Европы и в Арктике*, Москва 2012, p. 142.

Thus, productive cooperation with partners requires overcoming Russian 'complex of continental power' and turning towards the seas surrounding Russian landmass⁵¹. With lack of effective maritime presence and underdeveloped waterside infrastructure, Russia will be unable to withstand competition or exercise control over the claimed sector, not to mention using its resources. Rising power of the EU and NATO decision making and more efficient instruments to project their power into the Arctic confront Russia with a real threat of isolation. Lack of consensus with its partners in political and military sphere jeopardizes economic cooperation and causes damage to its image by attributing the it label of an obstructor. This confirms, that Russian Arctic strategy is under transformation and adaptation to new geopolitical conditions. This means, that until a universally applicable *modus vivendi* is elaborated, its policy will remain based on pragmatic principle of selective cooperation in solving the most acute problems on a bilateral basis.

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⁵¹ See: *ibidem*, p. 163.

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Abstract

The paper describes Russian strategy in the Arctic. Considering its significance for both internal and external aspects of Russian policy, the author analyses basic

objective and subjective factors shaping Russian policy in the region. Additionally, a list of resources and methods available and used by Russia towards the Arctic and its partners present in this region is presented. The author also attempts to suggest different scenarios of international implications of Russian policy.

Rosyjska strategia w Arktyce.

Czynniki, instrumenty i uwarunkowania międzynarodowe

Artykuł jest próbą opisu rosyjskiej polityki w regionie Arktyki. Biorąc pod uwagę znaczenie danego regionu tak dla polityki wewnętrznej, jak i zagranicznej Rosji, autor poddaje analizie podstawowe obiektywne i subiektywne czynniki kształtujące rosyjską politykę. Przedstawiony został także katalog środków i metod danej polityki dostępnych i używanych przez Federację Rosyjską. Autor podejmuje także kwestię różnych scenariuszy rozwoju rosyjskiej polityki w Arktyce i namysłu nad jej międzynarodowymi konsekwencjami.

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