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**The Arctic and Nordic
Countries in the World of Economy and Politics**

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**GOVERNANCE OF A CLIMATE CHANGE
– THE CASE OF THE ARCTIC**

The Arctic is currently undergoing a process of profound socio-economic and geo-political transformation. The character of remote and forgotten region seems to fade away due to the increased possibility of maritime transport (through the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage), extraction of oil and gas (approx. 20% of the World's undiscovered reserves) and other raw materials, fisheries and tourism. The main reason for changes in the dynamics of the region is the impact of global warming, in which one could see both opportunities and challenges. Exploitation of hydrocarbons can reshape future global energy system and help to maintain the wealth of the Arctic countries. On the other hand any modifications of the climate balance are a key threat for the ecosystem of the region, influencing the climate system on a global scale. The Arctic is a unique area because temperature there rises much faster than in other parts of the world making possible adaptation to changes much more complicated.

In relation to the Arctic region do not apply any separate multilateral rules of international law relating to the fight against climate change. The dynamics of the region is subordinated to action within a global climate policy that is strictly centralized and largely declarative. The failure of the recent climate negotiations proves that political leaders do not have enough will to take far-reaching commitments that could undermine their internal position. In this situation, the best solution is to strengthen the existing forms of cooperation agreements, based on functional coalitions, thus integrating governance on global, regional, national and local level. This involves participation not only of the state but also international organizations, transnational, sub-national or non-governmental actors.

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1. Governance

The term “governance” is a social process focused on managing human activities aimed at achieving specific collective effects. If we adopt a broad definition it is the determination, application and enforcement of rules. Rule management systems are created to respond to the needs of societies such as the production of public goods, avoiding the dangers, the internalisation of external processes or human rights protection, but one can not *a priori* assume that they are always guided by the common good.

According to G. Marks and L. Hooghe multi-level governance involving the wide spectrum of actors - states, organizations ect. - stands normatively higher than the monopoly of the central authorities as it covers various areas of jurisdiction². This model of governing is more efficient as it enables solving problems collectively and effectively especially in areas where individual actions are doomed to failure. Global climate is definitely a good example of a common good, which can not be provided by a single state. Climate is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous, which means that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce availability to others. However this good faces, how G. Hardin puts it “tragedy of commons” where consumption of a shared resource by individuals acting in their individual and immediate self-interest diminishes or even destroys the original resource³. Due to high complexity of the problem multi-level governance seems to be the best solution as it allows involvement of political, public and private actors, the heterogeneity of the activities of citizens, the credibility of political commitments, competition, innovation and experimentation.

Multilevel governance can take many forms, but two dominant models can be distinguished. The first one reminds federalism, with the central authorities and more or less independent subjects with defined scope of actions. As a result, this type of governance is limited to specific tasks that do not overlap and are relatively sparse. System management is assigned and fixed.

In international relations this model, gives priority to nation states, which remain the primary actors, as they decide on the management of international as well as local level. This frame relates primarily to the political choices of participants, time and methods of their actions and the cost they pay home. In the center of the analysis are issues such as elections, party systems, government authorities and professional politicians who translate public preferences into laws.

In the case of the second model jurisdictions are not limited to one level and operate within various units, designed to achieve specific tasks such as providing specific public good. As a result, multi-level self-management is distributed on the basis of diverse and voluntary groups / entities. According to E. Ostrom and

² G. Marks, L. Hooghe, *Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance*, in: *Multilevel-Governance*, ed. J. Bache, M. Flinders, Oxford 2004, p. 20-21.

³ G. Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, “Science” 1968, no. 162, p. 1243–1248.

J. Walker they can be family clans, associations and international regimes. This model is characterized by emphasis on the solution of the problem, especially on the issue of how citizens can get a good, which they are not able to create individually, what measures are most effective for a particular purpose⁴.

For climate governance mainly first, centralized model occurs as the supreme position of the state is being sustained. States act as the leading actors creating the dynamics on global, regional and sub-national level. The Arctic climate politics is therefore subordinated to wider dynamics of international climate regime. However there are signs that, due to more visible innertion of international community during climate negotiations, there is a pending need to create more functional coalitions based on various actors on different level of governance.

2. Global level of the Arctic climate governance

The international community drew attention to the problem of global climate change in the late 80s. The report *Our Common Future* prepared by the United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development (UNWCED) published in 1987 placed environmental issues firmly on the political agenda as it aimed to discuss the environment and development as one single issue⁵. It also acknowledged the impact of human - induced climate changes as a potential threat to future development.

In 1992 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Summit, introduced a climate issues on the agenda of international priorities, which also require global solutions. *The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change* signed in Rio created a basis for a climate regime under which states would voluntarily agree to adopt certain obligations and standards in order to control and limit human emissions of CO₂ and other substances⁶. The logic behind new regime was simple – global problems need global solutions as protection of a global public good - the climate - can not be provided individually by one country. Initially, the international community showed a considerable optimism, both in terms of means and ends. There was not only awaken political consciousness, but also a specific institutionalization. A positive example of how collective action can be effective was the Montreal Protocol of 1987, in which the signatories, pledged to reduce and completely halt emissions of chlorofluorocarbons causing ozone hole.

In case of climate change so fast and efficient solutions are not possible. Climate governance involves drastic changes in a number of areas such as energy, transport, agriculture or individual behavior which would result in systemic

⁴ E. Ostrom, J. Walker, *Neither Markets nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas*, (in:) *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook*, ed. D. Mueller, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. 36.

⁵ *Our Common Future*, UNWCED 1987, <http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf>.

⁶ *The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change*, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.

transformation of the global economy. Besides sectoral complexity there is difficulty in reaching a compromise between different states: developed and developing economies, main powers like China and USA, those touched by climate catastrophes and those gaining. As a result of political and economical costs of climate change governance climate negotiations slowed down. The goals have become less ambitious due to “free-riding” of some states⁷. The Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 which was meant to be just a starting point, was extended beyond 2012 because of a slowdown in global economy, and lack of political will of governments fearing the costs of modernization.

The protection of the Arctic climate highly depends on global dynamics. There are, in fact, no international law rules, which apply specific to the climate of the region. The key document that regulates adaptation to climate change is the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* signed in Montego Bay in December 1982. Although, the Convention has played a very important role, as a codifier in the number of existing customary norms and principles, it does not take into account the consequences of global warming, not only in the Arctic but in general. The only reference to the Arctic is art. 234, so called “Canadian case”, which gives coastal states the right to make regulations to combat pollution from ships in their economic zone. More advanced scope may take “The Polar Code”, which is being prepared by the International Maritime Organization⁸. Thus, the only international agreement referring to Arctic climate remains *Convention on the Conservation of Polar Bears* from 1973⁹.

3. Transnational institutions

Global agreements are therefore not a sufficient tool in the fight against global warming and - as stated above – the need to involve the widest possible range of actors becomes increasingly apparent. Transnational institutions seem to fulfill these functions in an optimal way as they create separate governance mode crossing supranational, national and local levels. They are based on horizontal, functionally similar coalitions, creating or combining private and public entities, state and non-state actors. Their rise is often parallel with international agreements, however, they aim at the establishment of a different mechanism of collective action because they focus on narrowly defined technical purposes, thus require less effort as they combine the existing structures. That explains why according to R. Keohane and J. Nye governance based on network minimalism, is the best form of power in the global era¹⁰.

⁷ Benefiting from resources, goods, or services without paying for them. Term used in theory of public goods.

⁸ E. Franckx, *Should the Law Governing Maritime Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Changing Climatic Circumstances*, (in:) *Climate Governance in the Arctic*, ed. T. Koivurova, E. Carina, N. Bankers, Springer 2009, p. 51-75.

⁹ *Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears*, November 15, 1973, <http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/agreement1973.html> [01.06.2014].

¹⁰ R. Keohane, J. Nye, *Introduction*, (in:) *Governance in a Globalizing World*, eds. J. Nye, J. Donahue, Washington DC 2000, p. 2.

Also, in case of climate policy, an increase in the importance of these organizations is visible. They began to emerge in the 80's and 90's (the World Conference on Atmospheric Change - Toronto 1988, Cities for Climate Protection - 1993), but their most dynamic development occurred as a result of the Kyoto Protocol. This wide in scope document was the result of intergovernmental agreement, but required for implementation the creation of transnational networks, based on the administrative apparatus, and non-governmental actors. New initiatives have been taken by both specific countries (eg. U.S. Municipal Energy Efficiency Project, USAID Ecolinks) and financial organizations (World Bank National Strategies Studies, OECD Programme on Climate Change).

Simultaneously, a new, previously absent, trend appeared – discourse of policy makers, media, and lobbying circles, started to be based on sheer facts submitted by experts mainly climatologists, physicists, geographers. This is how scientific background was supposed to justify unpopular and politically and economically costly decisions. It was also the public, which in the flood of conflicting climate scenarios, demanded a fair assessment of the situation. As a result, in 1988, governments agreed on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which T. O'Riordan et. al. describe as an initiative sponsored by the United Nations, composed of scientists of the Member States aimed to establish government control over politically vibrant problem¹¹. Although IPCC rose as a body based on governments' representatives it is also transnational in it's character. It is based on transnational networks of scientists supported with national, local technical assistance and administrative co-operation. This model reduces the cost of information flow and solves the dilemmas of decision-making. Five IPCC Reports (including the last one published in 2014) are a wide source of knowledge about the processes occurring in the Arctic region because they are based on knowledge of local and international scientists, whose results are peer-reviewed¹².

The Arctic region has more transnational organizations which, despite the different aims, consider the problem of global warming as a main area of interest. They operate mainly through international network of researchers with the purpose to exchange data and critical evaluation of research results. These include initiatives such as the International Polar Year, the International Arctic Research Center, and the International Arctic Science Committee. There are also organizations combining research with political and social activities such as Project Management Arctic or Northern Forum bringing together regional decision makers of Arctic states. National governments feel obliged to take into account position of such bodies as they give different perspective and in-depth assessment.

¹¹ T. O'Riordan, et al., *Institutional frameworks for political action*, (in:) *Human Choice and Climate Change. Volume 1- The Societal Framework*, ed. S. Rayner, E. Malone, Battelle Press, Washington 1998, p. 368.

¹² *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*, <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/>, [01.06.2014].

4. Regional organizations

The next level of governance- regional - refers to initiatives with a strong Arctic purpose. In contrast to the global level, regional one is more geographically concentrated, but contrary to the national level takes into account pan-regional interests rather than purely national particularism. At the regional level act primarily organizations of Arctic states. These include:

- Euro-Arctic Barents Council, established in 1993 under an agreement between Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia¹³;
- The Nordic Council, focusing on the problems of cooperation between the five Nordic countries and
- The Arctic Council, representing the eight Arctic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, United States and Sweden.

Especially the last one deserves attention as it is considered to be – due to its geographical scope - the main representative of the Arctic interests. The first step in the process of institutionalizing Arctic cooperation was adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991 with the participation of Finland and Canada. It was the proof that, after decades of the Cold War tensions, environmental problems can be a major factor integrating the countries of the region. The strategy identified the main threats such as heavy metals, acidification, radioactivity and also means to combat them. It established four working groups on flora and fauna, protection of the marine environment, emergencies, and monitoring and evaluation. After five years, in 1996, due to Canadian efforts, the Strategy has been institutionalized in the form of the Arctic Council bringing together eight countries. Council is more than a traditional international organization – rather a forum that brings together all countries of the region, indigenous peoples, and numerous affiliates such as non-governmental organizations or scientific centers. The main area of interest is the protection of the environment and sustainable development. Highly sensitive, political issues, such as military security, have been completely excluded from its agenda¹⁴.

In 2004 and 2005, the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee presented *the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, which is the most advanced assessment of the Arctic climate change and its impacts for the region and for the World¹⁵. Three hundred scientists over a span of three years evaluated and synthesized knowledge on climate variability, climate change, and increased ultraviolet radiation and their consequences such as rising temperatures, loss of sea ice, unprecedented melting of the ice sheet, and many impacts on ecosystems, animals, and people. The valuable continuation of the Arctic climate research

¹³ R.S. Czarny, *The Barents Cooperation: Progress in the Making*, (in:) *The Northern Spaces – Contemporary Issues*, ed. R.M. Czarny, R. Kubicki, A. Janowska, R.S. Czarny, SCANDINAVIUM, Warszawa – Kielce 2012, p. 45-64.

¹⁴ Więcej: T. Koivurova, W. Hasanat, *The Climate Policy of the Arctic Council*, (in:) *Climate Governance in the Arctic*, *op.cit.*, p. 51-75.

¹⁵ *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, Cambridge University Press 2005, pp. 1020.

Arctic Climate Impact Science – An Update Since ACIA was presented by the World Wildlife Fund in April 2008, at the meeting of the Arctic Council¹⁶. It provided large, updated review of Arctic climate impact science since the 2005 ACIA and was a sign of growing interest in the Arctic worldwide.

Moreover, the Council often presents common position on international forums. During the negotiations of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP), it draws attention to a particularly sensitive region. Sadly, to a lesser extent, it expresses its willingness to take concrete commitments, what highlights somewhat dysfunctional nature of the organization, which focuses exclusively on hazard identification and recommendation, leaving implementation to the governments.

However, in terms of political importance, the Arctic Council is growing. Undoubtedly, it has become the main place of discussion about the problems of the region, it has mobilized various actors and initiated many activities. Close co-operation with the indigenous peoples of the North, who share their unique knowledge of the consequences of the global warming and indicate where immediate action is necessary, is particularly precious. The Council also enjoys growing interest of the international community. The status of a permanent observer has been granted to 12 non-Arctic countries (including Poland), 9 intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and 11 non-government organizations. This means that the Council is at the forefront in introducing multi-level governance to the Arctic region using its all potential to coordinate different, but overlapping levels and jurisdictions¹⁷.

The European Union (EU), is also an organization which is worth mentioning in the context of the Arctic climate governance. It remains a World leader in promoting ambitious climate policy, despite unwillingness of other parties. The EU was the first (2005) to introduce internal emissions trading system. In addition, in December 2008, 27 countries of the EU set three very ambitious targets (energy and climate package) to be achieved by the end of 2020. United Europe can be also an influential advocate of the Arctic region's stability as it still wants to sustain its normative influence in immediate vicinity. This influence is fading in most of the regions – the Middle East or Ukraine – where open conflicts appear, but still Union is an important player whose soft diplomacy and green image can be helpful. Moreover, the EU, as the best example of how different governance modes can efficiently overlap and fluctuate, is a model example, which can be partly used in the Arctic region. Even the concept of multi-level governance introduced by Hooghe and Marks in the early 1990's resulted from the study of the new structures that were put in place by the EU (the Maastricht Treaty). As such, multi-level governance raised new and important questions about the role, power and authority of states.

¹⁶ *Arctic Climate Impact Science – An Update Since ACIA*, WWF 2008.

¹⁷ M. Tannenbergh, *Is Adaptation Governable in the Arctic? National and Regional Approaches to Arctic Adaptation Governance*, (in:) *Climate Governance in the Arctic*, op.cit., p. 291.

Paradoxically, the Community interest in the problems of the Arctic appeared relatively late, which was determined to a large extent by the geography. The EU members - Denmark, Finland and Sweden – cover only 10 % of the Arctic (the U.S. 15% , Canada 25% and Russia 50%). In 1995 the EU gained a new, Northern identity with Sweden and Finland as new members. Since 1999, the Community, through the determined lobbying of Helsinki, has been incorporating “The Northern Dimension” (ND) into its policies. After several years - in August 2002 - the geographical coverage of the ND was extended with the opening of the Arctic Window.

As a result, more and more alarmist scenarios of climate scientists and the growing interest of global players such as China, the Community institutions joined the discourse on the future of the region with ever greater commitment¹⁸. The European Parliament (EP) has chosen the strategy of strengthening relations with regional organizations such as the Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. In addition, it participated actively work of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, which is a forum for cooperation between parliamentarians of eight Arctic states and the EP deputies.

On 20th of November 2008 the EU adopted Communication *The European Union and the Arctic region* defining the strategic objectives of the Community in the region¹⁹. The communication presented an assessment of the challenges of the region, EU's objectives and initiatives and put forward concrete proposals. According to the Commission the scale of the challenges facing the Arctic, as well as the opportunities it offers will have a significant impact on the lives of future generations of the European citizens, and therefore the European Union's approach to these issues is coordinated, and in cooperation with the countries and territories of the Arctic region and other stakeholders. The Union therefore proposed multilateral regional management on the basis of existing agreements, in particular the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In all the EU's strategic documents on the Arctic region, climate change is seen as a main challenge as it results in modification of the entire ecosystem, and causes the race for natural resources that could lead to security threats for the EU and overall international instability. It proves that the EU sees the problem of a climate change in a broader, geopolitical perspective.

5. National interests in the Arctic

The EU diagnosis is correct in acknowledging that the Arctic becomes the object of political, economic, and even military rivalry between so-called Arctic "five" - A5 countries: Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia and the United States, but also other countries who want to take an active participation in a discussion about the potential of the region.

¹⁸ M. Tomala, *Northern Dimension of the European Union towards the Arctic*, (in:) *Northern Dimension of the European Union towards the Arctic*, op.cit., p. 20.

¹⁹ *The European Union and the Arctic region, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council*, http://ec.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf [01.06.2014].

Recently, Russia is particularly active in the Arctic. Judging on the methods chosen the Arctic activities are another vector of the general Kremlin policy to recover the position of a great power, as well as, to gain access to new resources. Attempts to rebuild the real military potential in the Russian Arctic are increasingly being replaced by the activities of an economic nature. Russia submitted a request to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to grant her the rights to 460 thousand square kilometers. The Arctic was also included in the Russian national development program for 2020, which assumes oil production outside the mainland shelf delimitation, increased fishing and processing, establishing a system of transport management, environmental protection and the protection of wider security interests in the region. This is a signal that Russian activity in the Arctic region will rather intensify and preferred method would be both legal action (the agreement with Norway from 2010) and actions made (Russian flag under the North Pole, 2007). Climate change, in this perspective, is perceived by the Russian authorities as an opportunity which can help to sustain high level of extraction of oil and gas and in result contribute to strong international position.

The United States, an Arctic country since the purchase of Alaska in 1867, also intensifies its actions in the region. Already in the 90's Washington showed significant activity in the struggle with the nuclear legacy of the European Far North for example, in the framework of the Program for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, clear focus on securing Washington's own interests, first and foremost in the American sector of the Arctic, appears. The biggest challenge is the fact that the USA, as the only Arctic country, avoids commitments bound by international law. Washington is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982. Resistance stems from Senate's fear that "Arctic case" will limit U.S. freedom of navigation and thereby undermine the strategic position in the different regions of the World. It also refused to take obligations within the Kyoto Protocol, seen as unfavorable to the U.S. economy. In effect American involvement in the Arctic governance seems to avoid global level of commitment.

The situation is slightly different in Canada, where Arctic policy is a key part of the political debate. Canada tried to announce its Arctic territory already in the 50's of the twentieth century, when official maps were issued with large parts of the Arctic Ocean marked as the area under Canadian sovereignty. Although this interpretation has been challenged by other countries, Canada established unilaterally 100 -mile ecological zone where it enforces full jurisdiction. The problem reminded silent for many decades but today, as a result of global warming, the Northwest Passage in northern Canada is becoming a viable alternative to route through the Panama Canal²⁰. Thus, the transport of goods from Europe to East Asia can be significantly reduced. For this reason, the United

²⁰ Więcej: M. Gabryś, *From the Northwest Passage to the Canadian Inland Waters: Political History of the Canadian Arctic Waters*, „Ad Americam” 2008, Vol. 9, p. 49-59.

States, but also countries of the European Union, does not recognize the special nature of the frozen straits and their status of internal waters. Although global warming can actually undermine Canadian sovereignty, the country withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in December 2011 due to economic reasons.

Norway in contrast, is a determined supporter of climate negotiations. It however, prefers all mechanisms that allow a developed country to purchase emissions permits abroad thus letting national emissions to grow. This is the result of Norwegian economy model based on oil and gas extraction. Large revenues allow Oslo to buy off permits and tranquil big energy sector. In consequence Norwegian authorities expand drills far north in the Barents Sea, also with cooperation with Russian counterparts, although still declaring full dedication to climate protection.

Denmark, as other Arctic states, will not give up the struggle for influence in the region. It sends scientific expeditions to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge geologically belongs to Greenland. Additionally, prolonged dispute with Canada over Hans Island takes place. Although countries have concluded a functional agreement with regard to fishing, environmental protection and coverage of the continental shelf, none of them wants to give up sovereignty. Nevertheless Danish authorities are the most dedicated to climate politics of all Arctic countries. The climate summit (COP) of 2009 in Copenhagen was the biggest priority for the government, and despite its failure, Denmark played a decisive and constructive role²¹.

As a result of growing tensions in May 2008, the countries of "Arctic Five" have adopted the *Ilulissat Declaration*, which stated that they will comply with the existing legal framework and properly solve the issues of overlapping claims²². Since then, several of them have taken actions to extend or confirm the scope of their own jurisdiction.

6. Sub-national players

As policies of states show limited interest in the Arctic climate and often even colliding claims, it is essential to turn to other actors in search for more optimal forms of climate governance. In the last 20 years there has been a significant increase in the importance of sub-national players, in case of the Arctic: indigenous people. They have a growing impact on the overall political agenda, especially with regard to climate change as they feel modifications of their hunting areas, diet and place of residence in the most severe way. At the same time they have a vast, multi-generational knowledge about the ecosystem in which they live, which can be used constructively in scientific studies. The progressive tendency is to endow them with more political subjectivity, in some cases even self-

²¹ K. Isted, *Sovereignty in the Arctic: an Analysis of Territorial Disputes Considerations and Environmental Policy*, "Journal of Transnational Law & Policy" 2009, Vol. 18.2, p. 345-369.

²² *The Ilulissat Declaration of the five Arctic States*, May 28, 2008, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf, [01.06.2014].

governance. The good evidence is an agreement between the Inuit of Nunavut and the Government of Canada or Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which give many rights to the local population in terms of the use of raw materials, water, national parks, and planning. Three Nordic countries also approved indigenous political representation in the form of Sami parliaments and all six peoples of the North have been granted a status of a permanent member within the Arctic Council.

The most clear emancipatory aspirations have become visible in Greenland, inhabited in 90% by the Inuits. The island steadily becomes independent from external influences – that is mainland Denmark and the EU. On the basis of referendum of 21 June 2009 local authorities gradually take control over the police and judiciary, but also over natural resources. It seems that the last link connecting the island with the Danish crown remains foreign and defense policy, which will be, however, consulted with the Greenlandic authorities. Global warming for ice-covered Greenland, will have two effects. On the one hand, the traditional way of life of the population will change dramatically and on the other, however, the possibility of exploitation of natural resources may make Greenland a leader in oil and gas exports provoking even final secession.

Generally, states' attitudes to the Arctic sub-state dynamics is largely the result of political system, economy and the country's international position. Canadian authorities, although neglecting global climate regime, tend to involve local communities in decision-making to the greatest extent, which is in part a consequence of a strong federalist model. The United States and Russia, although being also federal states, prefer centralized top-down model, in which local communities are merely passive observers. The Nordic countries, with strong consensual culture, use a mixed model based on consultations between public and private subjects on local, regional and national level.

7. Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the Arctic, as well as other regions, faces overlapping levels of global, transnational, regional, national and sub-national governance typical for a globalized World. However, the state remains the key player in shaping the climate policies, as it possesses major implementation tools. It is the one that makes the selection of goals and means. The more governments will be able to take the long view, covering several generations, the fight against global warming has a greater chance of success. However the latest dynamics of climate negotiations proves that globally integrated and effective action by all countries to combat climate change, is impossible.

The Arctic countries will be undoubtedly in an ambivalent situation. The Arctic is portrayed as an energy Eldorado for the future, which will fulfill global needs for hydrocarbons in the twenty-first century. Even if the climate protection would be at heart of all Arctic governments combining it with energy policies will create

fast, internal tensions. The Governments would have to show real dedication and conciliate the interests of different parties.

Therefore, to achieve effects it is necessary to strengthen the impact of other actors representing different levels of management: transnational, regional and sub-national, which is typical for decentralized model of multi-level governance. With transnational connections it is possible to exploit the potential of private and public, state and non-state actors from different countries aiming at common functional goals. Regional level allows access to full knowledge of the challenges and looks to the Arctic as a socio-ecological entity. Sub-regional level, in turn, presents the local dynamics seen from the perspective of the communities most affected by climate change.

Thus, the future Arctic governance will depend on inclusion of indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations and regional or local authorities in decision-making process while maintaining the role of states as the architects of the main principles. This new model of governing brings in new issues such as identity, citizenship, sovereignty, community, and subsidiarity so successful management in the Arctic should focus on building trust and peace, improving regulatory framework, introduction of holistic activities, improved mechanisms for political dialogue, adaptation to climate change and sustainable regional growth with the participation of all stakeholders.

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Abstract

The Arctic is currently undergoing a process of profound socio-economic and geo-political transformation. The character of remote and forgotten region seems to fade away due to the increased possibility of maritime transport (through the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage), extraction of oil and gas and other raw materials, fisheries and tourism. The main reason for changes in the dynamics of the region is the impact of global warming. In relation to the Arctic region do not apply any separate multilateral rules of international law relating to the fight against climate change. The dynamics of the region is subordinated to action within a global climate policy, that is strictly centralized and largely declarative. The governance of the Arctic involves participation not only of the state but also international organizations, transnational, sub-national or non-governmental actors.

Zarządzanie zmianami klimatycznymi – przypadek Arktyki

Arktyka obecnie przechodzi proces głębokiej transformacji społeczno-gospodarczej i geopolitycznej. Postrzeganie jej jako odległego i mało atrakcyjnego regionu wydaje się zanikać, ze względu na zwiększone możliwości transportu morskiego (przez Przejście Północno-Zachodnie i Przejście Północno-Wschodnie), wydobywania ropy i gazu i innych surowców, rybołówstwa i turystyki. Główną przyczyną zmian w dynamice regionu jest wpływ globalnego ocieplenia. W odniesieniu do Arktyki nie są stosowane żadne oddzielne wielostronne zasady prawa międzynarodowego odnoszące się do walki ze zmianami klimatycznymi.

Działania w regionie podporządkowane są globalnej polityce klimatycznej, która jest ściśle scentralizowana i w dużej mierze deklaratorywna. Zarządzanie Arktyką i konsekwencjami zmian klimatycznych obejmuje udział nie tylko państw, ale również organizacji międzynarodowych, międzynarodowych, aktorów niższego szczebla lub pozarządowych.

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