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HYBRID WAR – A POTENTIAL THREAT TO POLAND

Abstract

In the 21st century, a new type of international conflicts - hybrid wars-arose. In the face of the ongoing crisis in the neighboring country Ukraine, the Polish authorities were forced to increase their activity in the area of national security. The level of defense expenditures has been increasing significantly over recent years, the army is being modernized and security procedures adequate to contemporary threats are constantly being developed. Similar activities are carried out simultaneously in the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Poland is a member. All these campaigns are aimed at increasing the security of our country against possible hybrid conflicts.

Key words

hybrid wars, terrorism, threats, security of Poland

Introduction

The 21st century was a period of time where an extraordinary development of a new quality of war conflicts has occurred. Increasingly, the borders between regular warfare and situations of relative peace dissolve, with war as such having only low intensive characteristics². This contains regular and irregular military conflicts, cyberspace attacks, economic psychological, informational and propagandistic actions³. Current military interventions do not have any territorial restrictions, are not formally declared and do not reveal the real nor concrete opponents of the conflict. In order to run an attack, no war zones exist. Therefore, conflicts take place in international areas, including the political, economic and humanitarian sphere.

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² M. Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History: 1500 to Today*, Gotham Books, New York 2006.

³ C. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, Phoenix, London 2005.

Nowadays, more often war is conceived as an act of terrorism, hacker attacks, the usage of non-military manipulation of the population or cybernetic information wars⁴.

The dangerous activities that are not considered as war, are usually run by an aggressor who is not able to run a regular, open war. He is sufficiently organised to cause a long-lasting destabilization of the victim's security with the help of separatist groups, terroristic organizations or cyber-attacks⁵.

The aim of the article is to discuss the potential threats of a hybrid war that may threaten Poland and the level of Poland's preparation for possible aggression and indication of ways to prepare for defence.

Hybrid warfare – definitions

Knowing the definition of hybrid warfare is crucial to completely analyze the stage of Poland's preparations to potential participation in this type of conflict and to fully understand the influence of confrontations on foreign territory, on our countries' security.

A hybrid war is called as a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution⁶. The National Bureau of Security defines hybrid war as a conflict that combines all kinds of means and methods of violence, including armed regular and irregular actions, operations in cyberspace and economic, psychological, information (propaganda) campaigns, etc.⁷.

Lieutenant colonel Jacek Lasota⁸ – the head of History of Martial Art and Polemology of the War Studies University expands the definition of *hybrid war*. Besides cybernetics, partisans and terroristic actions, he mentions the usage of special forces in fights, information activities, political isolation, the imposition of economic sanctions, the intervention as peacekeeper soldiers under the pretext of the protection of human rights, and the conduct of humanitarian operations, e.g. the Russian white convoy to Ukraine⁹.

According to Frank Hoffman¹⁰, the specialist on national security, *hybrid war* is: "the combination of the fatality of international conflicts and long lasting zeal of irregular conflicts [...]. These complicated campaigns combine conventional, low-

⁴ M. Wrzosek, *Zagrożenia militarne a bezpieczeństwo Europy*, „Kwartalnik Bellona”, 2012, No 4, p. 7.

⁵ A. Gruszcak, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen – analiza krytyczna* [in:] W. Sokoła, B. Zapła (ed.), *Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów*, Wydawnictwo BBN, Warszawa 2011, p.11.

⁶ Z. Bąbczyńska-Jelonek, *The hybrid war*, 8.03.2015, [online:] <https://sophico21.blogspot.com/2015/03/wojna-hybrydowa.html>, (19.11.2017).

⁷ (MINI)SŁOWNIK BBN: *Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa*, [online:] <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-bbn-propozy/6035>, MINISŁOWNIK-BBN-Propozycje-nowych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html (12.10.2017).

⁸ Head of the Department of History of War Art and Polemology of the Warsaw Academy of War Art (ASzWoj) [online:] <http://www.wwoj.akademia.mil.pl/instytut-strategii-wojskowej/zaklad-historii-sztuki-wojennej-i-polemologii.html> (09.11.2017).

⁹ *Eksperci: wojny hybrydowe to nic nowego*, 16.04.2015, [online:] <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/eksperci-wojny-hybrydowe-to-nic-nowego/t0cdy1>, (21.11.2017).

¹⁰ A foreign officer of US Army has studied with his team various contemporary models of theoretical wars In order to explain potential hybrid treat on its example.

intensive operations with special activities and offensive operations in cyberspace and psychological actions, including the utilization of social media with traditional operations as a means to influence public opinion; also on the international field”¹¹.

While talking about hybrid war, it is crucial to mention the concept of the Russian general Walerij Gierasimow¹², who has used his theory in practice during the operation on Ukraine. He claims that in the 21st century’s the borders between peace and war are disappearing and there are no formal declarations of war nor peace. According to him, currently the most important means of warfare are non-military which include political, economic and humanitarian instruments, combined with propaganda activities. These actions are characterized by so-called asymmetrical actions, military means contributing to information war and the operations of special forces and of internal oppositional political parties which are aimed to encompass the whole of the enemy’s territory¹³.

Bearing in mind the definitions presented above, it is possible to tell that hybrid war is multi-faceted and implies various hostile actions which main purpose is to cause a destabilization of the function of the nation, to increase chaos and confusion and to exacerbate internal social conflicts. This is carried out in such a way to not exceed the formal threshold of an open armed conflict, while making it difficult or even impossible to indicate the leader of the action.

The most important target set by the attacker after calling a hybrid war is to exert the pressure on the civil population of the attacked country with various non-military methods and to manipulate facts in order to affect the international community. The most commonly used methods are: intensified hostile propaganda and information activities in cyberspace, unfavourable diplomatic campaigns and high levels of activities of the attackers’ special forces, by exerting economic pressure on the attacked country. Also, the attacker’s policy of intimidation on the attacked society is of great importance, for example by: the movement of enemy troops at the borders (conducting exercises or manoeuvres) and an increased consolidation of the aggressor’s army and patrol flights over the territory of the intimidated state.

Debates on the hybrid war in Poland

The concept of *hybrid war*, as most often called current war conflicts, is a relatively new concept (first used in 2002¹⁴). Despite such a short history of this kind of disputes, they have become a great challenge for security in many countries around the world. Since 2014, that is, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, Poland has also been perceived as a serious threat of the possibility of an attack.

¹¹ F.G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st century: Rise of the Hybrid Wars*, Arlington 2007, [online:] http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf (11.10.2017).

¹² Soviet and Russian military commander, general of the army, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – first deputy minister of defense, [online:] http://www.nowoczesne.Auto.pl/art,Walerij_Gierasimow.Html (11.10.2017).

¹³ M. Galeotti, *The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War*, 6.07.2014, [online:] <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war> (9.11.2017).

¹⁴ W.J. Nemeth, *Future war and Chechnya: A case for hybrid warfare*, Monterey 2002, [online:] http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5865/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf?sequence=1 (3.11.2017).

Thereafter, the implementation of defence procedures and actions to increase our security against cyber-attacks has been accelerated. This problem is addressed at various types of conferences, discussions and meetings as well as in many media. The problem of this type of war in the world is not new, and the combination of military and civilian activities has been known for a long time. However, only the encounter with this conflict at our eastern neighbour in the Crimea has made us aware of the completely new dimension of this type of war. It threatened Poland and exposed the deficiencies Poland has in the defence policy for this type of threats. The first debate – a scientific conference on this subject took place in Warsaw, April 16, 2015 within the walls of the National Defence University (now War Studies University). It was entitled: *The hybrid war and aggression below the threshold of war – possible threats and challenges for the national security of the Republic of Poland*¹⁵. The co-organizer of the symposium was the National Security Bureau. The debate included experts who exchanged views on new potential threats, how to counteract them, and operational challenges. The conclusions and recommendations about a potential attack for the national security system were presented at the event. The discussion was divided into three panels: the first one was entitled “The hybrid war as the old and new form of organized military and non-military violence”, the second concerned the non-military dimension of hybrid war and the third its military aspect. A case study of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was also presented, where evidence provided that the activities in Ukraine were carried out by specially created structures of the Russian army. This shows Russia’s long and intense preparations for this aggression.

Nowadays the subject of hybrid wars and the analysis of dangers directly related to it is an inseparable part of many meetings, discussions and scientific conferences of Polish specialists in the field of national defence.

International preparations for a hybrid war

For several years, Poland has joined the trend of preparing various states for a possible hybrid war. The coordinators of activities are international organizations that give recommendations and guidance to their members, and instruct how to take preventive action to avoid threats and increase security in the face of an approaching uncertain future perspective. One of the first recommendations for security and counteracting the *hybrid war* that the United Nations has issued was the *Concept of Security Sector Reform*, presented at the UN Security Council Resolution 2151 (S/RES/2151)¹⁶. It contained tools that may be necessary to fight against potential threats that may come with an outbreak of a conflict called the *hybrid war*. The purpose of this document was to provide guidance and advice to strengthen states’ ability to self-defence and ensure the security of their citizens by adopting the principles of transparency and accountability. Poland, the EU countries and many other countries around the world have adapted their internal documents and have taken actions aimed at creating a common security and defence policy.

¹⁵ *Wojna hybrydowa i agresja poniżej progu wojny*, 17.04.2015, [online:] <http://old.aon.edu.pl/2015/04/17/wojna-h-ybrydowa-i-agresja-ponizej-progu-wojny> (23.11.2017).

¹⁶ *Resolution 2151 (2014)*, 28.04.2014, [online:] http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF6F9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2151.pdf (21.10.2017).

Also, for several years the EU has been preparing guidelines for its member states to improve security in the European Community, including Poland. During this period, communications and recommendations for member states were published, in which the methodology and ways of new potential conflict prevention were discussed. The most well-known documents were, among others: *EU policy framework in the field of cyber defense*¹⁷ and *Policy framework for systematic and long-term cooperation in the field of defense*¹⁸ published on 18 November 2014, *EU Council Conclusions on the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)* with 18 May 2015¹⁹ and *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements of an EU-wide strategic framework to support the security sector reform* of 5 July 2016²⁰.

The document, *Common vision, joint action: Stronger Europe. Global strategy for the foreign and security policy of the European Union*²¹ specifying which security conditions should be fulfilled by the EU member states, was published on 28 June 2016. It is a comprehensive security strategy that replaced the outdated in December 12, 2003 *European security strategy*²². The new document defined common interests of the EU and the Member States, referred to, inter alia: the security of the territory and its citizens, prosperity, democracy and world order. The principles by which the EU will be guided in its further activity have been outlined. These include: unity, cooperation, responsibility and the deepening of external partnerships. The strategy has also identified five key EU priorities for the upcoming years:

1. Security of the Union – intensification of activities in the field of defence, cyber security, combating terrorism as well as in the field of energy and strategic communication.
2. Neighbourhood – investing in the resilience of countries and societies lying on the East and South of the EU – defined as the ability of states and societies to reform themselves, and thus to combat crises.
3. An integrated approach to conflict situations (war and crisis) – immediate reaction, preventive actions, investing in stabilization.
4. Supporting stable regional orders based on cooperation throughout the world (regions as a key governance space).

¹⁷ *Ramy polityki UE w zakresie cyberobrony*, 18.11.2014, [online:] <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15585-2014-INIT/pl/pdf> (7.11.2017).

¹⁸ *Ramy polityki w zakresie systematycznej i długoterminowej współpracy w dziedzinie obronności*, 18.11.2014, [online:] <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15562-2014-INIT/pl/pdf> (7.11.2017).

¹⁹ *Konkluzje Rady w sprawie WPBiO*, 18.05.2015, [online:] <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8971-2015-INIT/pl/pdf> (7.11.2017).

²⁰ *Elementy ogólnounijnych ram strategicznych w celu wspierania reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa*, 5.07.2016, [online:] <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0031&qid=1471524244801&from=PL> (12.10.2017).

²¹ *Wspólna wizja, wspólne działanie: Silniejsza Europa. Globalna strategia na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, 2016, [online:] http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_pl.pdf (12.09.2017).

²² *Europejska strategia bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie*, 2009, [online:] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/strategia_bezpieczenstwa_ue_2003.pdf (17.09.2017).

5. Effective global governance in the 21st century – working towards a global order based on international law, ensuring respect for human rights, sustainable development and sustainable access to global common goods²³.

It was only the entering of the Russian army in Crimea in 2014 that made the leaders of many countries aware of the threat they faced and what a *hybrid war* is. In the face of the growing threat and the aggravating situation in Europe, the EU strengthens the security of the Community, its Member States and partner countries through strengthened cooperation in this area with NATO²⁴, to counter hybrid warfare. The signed agreement is to ensure, among others: raising the mutual awareness of individual countries, strengthening the resilience of key sectors (cyber security, health care, finance and infrastructure), or preventing crises²⁵. The partners, in accordance with the discussed document, are obliged to support countries that are most exposed to the risk of a *new* war, helping them to prepare for a possible outbreak of conflict. Such measures should in the longer-term lead to the strengthening of peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area.

In parallel with other international organizations, also NATO has been preparing strategies on hybrid conflict. Poland belongs to this organization since 1999, but the biggest impact on the security of our country had the resolutions of the summit, which took place in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016²⁶. The most important decisions of the summit, which have an impact on improving Poland's defence, included:

- strengthening the eastern flank of NATO by establishing four battalion battle groups stationed in the Baltic States and Poland, command of the Polish group (American, British and Romanian troops) will cover the United States;
- signing a document on the coordination of EU and NATO activities in the area of hybrid threats as well as the migration and security crisis;
- recognition of cyberspace as the area of warfare and intensification of cooperation in this area²⁷.

At the NATO summit held in Brussels on 25 May 2017, the main discussions focused on NATO-EU co-operation and the joint fight against terrorism which is becoming more and more dangerous. The implementation of provisions contained in the previous summit in the field of building a security space in Poland and Eastern Europe was confirmed. It was also informed about the planned introduction of a new regulation increasing the annual expenditure of NATO member states on defence to the level of 2.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020 and 2.5% by 2030 and

²³ *Globalna strategia UE w dziedzinie polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa*, 28.06.2016, [online:] http://oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/pigulki/globalna%20strategia_2016.pdf (22.11.2017).

²⁴ *Bezpieczeństwo: UE wzmacnia reakcję na zagrożenia hybrydowe*, 6.04.2016, [online:] www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1227_pl.pdf (11.11.2017).

²⁵ *Hybrydowe zagrożenia*, 6.04.2016, [online:] <http://www.europedirect-rzeszow.pl/aktualnosci/hybrydowe-zagrozenia> (7.11.2017).

²⁶ *8 kluczowych postanowień szczytu NATO w Warszawie. Punkt po punkcie*, 10.07.2016, [online:] <http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/958812,8-kluczowych-postanowien-szczytu-nato-punkt-po-punkcie-po-dsumowanie.html> (15.11.2017).

²⁷ P. Wroński, *Szczyt NATO w Warszawie. Najważniejsze ustalenia*, 11.07.2016, [online:] <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,20380134,szczyt-nato-w-warszawie-najwazniejsze-ustalenia.html> (25.10.2017).

the initial declaration of a prolongation of the stationing of NATO battalion eastern flank battle groups until 2022²⁸.

Concepts to improve Poland's security

Poland's preparations to protect against possible hybrid war have been going on for several years²⁹. The first document in which this problem was addressed as a threat to our country was the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* published in 2014³⁰. It was elaborated on the basis of conclusions resulting from the document prepared by the BBN a year earlier under the name *White Book of National Security of the Republic of Poland*³¹. The strategy identifies threats and priorities for actions aimed at protecting one's territory and contribution to the shaping of international security³². The main threats to Poland include: Russia's superpower aspirations and its hybrid war, the development of international terrorism and the threat of hacking cyber attacks. As priorities for the coming years, it was indicated: building its own defence potential, extending military cooperation with NATO and the United States, while limiting the role of the EU as a partner for joint military operations³³. There are also records about the creation of the *Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland*³⁴ and the draft of the *Information Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland*³⁵, which were also published in 2015. These documents were entirely focused on Poland's preparations for a potential fight in the hybrid conflict. They discussed the necessity of taking preventive actions and counteracting threats in cyberspace and in the media.

The clarification and organization of all the activities carried out so far has found their place in the *Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*³⁶ presented by the Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz presented on May 23, 2017. It contains the overall results of the *Strategic Defence Review 2016*, indicating the challenges in the next 15 years and the necessary directions of change to meet the

²⁸ Prezydent Duda: jesteśmy solidarni, stanowimy jedność w NATO, 25.05.2017, [online:] <http://www.tvp.info/30952480/prezydent-duda-jestesmy-solidarni-stanowimy-jednosc-w-nato> (17.10.2017).

²⁹ K. Liedel, *Zagrożenia hybrydowe. Jak zmienia się środowisko bezpieczeństwa RP?*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego Wojna hybrydowa – Wydanie specjalne”, 2015, p. 51-58.

³⁰ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 5.11.2014, [online:] <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf> (16.10.2017).

³¹ *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 2013, [online:] http://www.spbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/Biala_Ksiega_inter_mm.pdf (16.10.2017).

³² A. Legucka, *Główne założenia Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP 2014*, [in:] R. Kupiecki (ed.), *Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP. Pierwsze 25 lat*, Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej, Warszawa 2015, s. 136-152.

³³ M. Milczanowski, *Rola Polski w polityce międzynarodowej z perspektywy Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2014*, 19.11.2014, [online:] <https://mmilczanowski.wordpress.com/2014/11/19/rola-polski-w-polityce-miedzynarodowej-z-perspektywy-strategii-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-2014> (10.11.2017).

³⁴ *Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 22.01.2015, [online:] <http://en.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/DCB.pdf> (22.10.2017).

³⁵ *Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego – Projekt*, 24.07.2015, [online:] https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/Projekt_Doktryny_Bezpieczenstwa_Informacyjnego_RP.pdf (16.10.2017).

³⁶ *Koncepcja obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 05.2017, [online:] http://www.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/rozne/2017/05/KORP_DRUK_v03_mn2.pdf (11.11.2017).

assumed challenges³⁷. The main idea of the document is to constantly increase the ability to deter attackers based on their own defence potential of the Polish Armed Forces, and the objective of our army in 2032 to be ready in every aspect, i.e. to have modern equipment, properly trained soldiers and practiced operating procedures.

Preparations of the Polish army for a hybrid war

Bearing in mind the geographical location of Poland (direct neighbourhood with the Kaliningrad region), our country is one of the most vulnerable to aggressive politics from Russia. That is why it is important to constantly prepare our country and our army for a possible armed conflict.

One of the permanent elements of the implementation of the security system is maintaining a consistently high level of military expenditures – at least 2% of GDP³⁸. This level of Poland's obligations results from obligations imposed on NATO members. However, not all Member States fulfil this commitment. Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has mentioned this at the already-quoted Brussels NATO summit. He drew the attention of the allies to the issue of unequal burden sharing, including their defence spending. He recalled that out of the 28 countries belonging to the Alliance, only five, except Poland, the USA, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Greece, allocate the amounts set by NATO for defence purposes. Among the countries that do not comply with the commitment are those that have been doing so for years and have huge backlogs against the pact³⁹. Poland's investment in its own security and efficiency of the army improvement results from the specifics of the hybrid war. This is quite a specific conflict, and the attacked country must count in the first period of the war in the fight against the aggressor only on its own strength. This is due to difficulties with the actual statement whether the armed operation has already begun and who is the aggressor, and thus it is difficult to count on the decisive help of the allies and the quick reaction of the international community.

The second extremely important element of improving security is to strengthen military cooperation with other EU and NATO member states and countries of the region in order to develop common methods of building defence potential against a possible hybrid attack. It is also important to establish and constantly strengthen mutual cooperation between international organizations in order to achieve the greatest possible psychological advantage over potential attackers⁴⁰.

³⁷ *Koncepcja obronna RP*, 24.05.2017, [online:] <http://kresy24.pl/koncepcja-obronna-polski-glownym-zrodlem-niestabilnosci-w-regionie-jest-rosja-obrona-odstraszenie-czlonkostwo-w-nato-i-ue-kluczowe-dla-bezpieczenstwa-panstwa> (27.10.2017).

³⁸ *Wiceszef MON: 2,5 proc. PKB na obronność to absolutne minimum, by Polska była bezpieczna*, 25.04.2017, [online:] <http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/337173-wiceszef-mon-25-proc-pkb-na-obronnosc-to-absolutne-minimum-by-polska-byla-bezpieczna> (22.11.2017).

³⁹ *Mattis wezwał państwa NATO do zwiększania wydatków. Stoltenberg: cieszę się z każdej presji*, 15.02.2017, [online:] <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/bruksela-spotkanie-ministrow-obrony-krajow-nato,715766.html> (17.10.2017).

⁴⁰ P. Pindják, *Powstrzymanie wojny hybrydowej szansą na współpracę NATO i Unii Europejskiej?*, [online:] <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Also-in-2014/Detering-hybrid-warfare/PL/index.htm> (17.10.2017).

One of the permanent elements of improving the combat capabilities of the Polish army is participation in various types of manoeuvres and tactical exercises. The biggest in 2017 were: Dragon-17⁴¹, CMX17⁴², PACE17⁴³, Bison Drawsko⁴⁴, Baltops 2017⁴⁵ or Saber Strike 17⁴⁶.

The comprehensive adaptation of the Polish army to the possibility of independent fighting in the hybrid war is related to the fulfilment of all the assumptions of the *Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*⁴⁷. It assumes, among others creation of the fourth division of operational forces and increasing the number of soldiers as well as the development of the Territorial Defence Forces. An integrated stop system will be created in the Baltic Sea, based on 4 submarines, Coastal Missile Systems and mine actions and aviation⁴⁸. The priority list also includes unmanned air, sea and land platforms – as a reconnaissance means, modern communication and command support systems as well as 5th generation fighters. Another way to achieve success is to strengthen military cooperation in the region – the Baltic Sea basin, the Visegrad Group, the eastern flank of NATO⁴⁹.

Summary

The events of 2014 in Ukraine completely changed the classification of threats for Poland and Europe. There was a new but very significant threat – a hybrid war, or military operations below the threshold of the classic war. As a consequence of these events in our country, internal preventive actions aimed at increasing security, i.e. increasing defence and technical modernization of the army, as well as protection of cyberspace, which became the next milieu of armed struggle, are becoming more and more visible in our country. Modernization of the army is to be targeted at technical novelties – cyber defence and cyber-weapons, unmanned combat and support systems, as well as satellite technologies used for state security purposes⁵⁰. In addition,

⁴¹ *Zagrożenia konwencjonalne i wojna hybrydowa. 17 tys. żołnierzy na manewrach Dragon-17*, 5.09.2017, [online:] <https://www.pch24.pl/zagrozenia-konwencjonalne-i-wojna-hybrydowa--17-tys--zolnierzy-na-manewrach-dragon-17,54324,i.html> (11.11.2017).

⁴² *Ćwiczenie zarządzania kryzysowego NATO – CMX 2017*, 2.10.2017, [online:] <http://rcb.gov.pl/cwicz-enie-zarzadzania-kryzysowego-nato-cmx-2017> (11.11.2017).

⁴³ *UE po raz pierwszy przeprowadzi szkolenia z weryfikacji mechanizmów reagowania na zagrożenia hybrydowe*, 29.09.2017, [online:] <http://wschodnik.pl/swiat/item/13708-ue-po-raz-pierwszy-przeprowadzi-szkolenia-z-weryfikacji-mechanizmow-reagowania-na-zagrozenia-hybrydowe.html> (11.11.2017).

⁴⁴ M. Górka, *Na linii ognia, czyli „Bison Drawsko 2017”*, 1.02.2017, [online:] <http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/21692?t=Na-linii-ognia-czyli-Bison-Drawsko-2017> (11.11.2017).

⁴⁵ *Baltops 2017. Amerykański desant w Uście*, 14.06.2017, [online:] <http://www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/wiadomosci/slupsk/a/baltops-2017-amerykanski-desant-w-ustce-zdjecia-wideo,12179224> (11.11.2017).

⁴⁶ *3 tys. żołnierzy NATO na manewrach Saber Strike 17*, 16.06.2017, [online:] <http://niezalezna.pl/100636-3-tys-zolnierzy-nato-na-manewrach-saber-strike-17> (11.11.2017).

⁴⁷ *Koncepcja obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 05.2017, [online:] http://www.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/rozne/2017/05/KORP_DRUK_v03_mn2.pdf (11.11.2017).

⁴⁸ *Koncepcja Obronna RP: Nowa dywizja i myśliwce 5. generacji*, 23.05.2017, [online:] <http://www.defence24.pl/599055,koncepcja-obronna-rp-nowa-dywizja-i-mysliwce-5-generacji> (17.10.2017).

⁴⁹ *Znamy założenia Koncepcji Obronnej RP*, 23.05.2017, [online:] <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/znamy-zalozenia-koncepcji-obronnej-rp/92vmrvl> (16.10.2017).

⁵⁰ *Trzecia fala modernizacji Sił Zbrojnych RP*, 22.05.2014, [online:] <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/5561,Trzecia-fala-modernizacji-Sil-Zbrojnych-RP.html?search=115830643> (16.10.2017).

the current law is continually under review, aimed at adapting it in such a way that in the event of a hybrid conflict, it is possible to use the army to counteract the existing crises⁵¹. Potential scenarios for the outbreak of a hybrid war on the territory of Poland⁵² or global conflict⁵³ are also analysed.

Currently implemented activities on the political and military level are to lead to a situation in which the Polish army will be able to effectively deter possible attackers. As a result Poland will not be surprised, and will be ready to effectively counterattack both independently and in cooperation with the allies. In the international dimension, allies' support is ensured by signed cooperation agreements between NATO and the EU as well as implemented UN directives, which enable coordination of planned defence activities and increase of stability in the area of both Poland and the whole of Europe. The guarantee of security are also allied troops stationed in our country, which strengthen the eastern flank of NATO and cause that the attack on our country is tantamount to an attack on our allies.

Considering the level of Poland's immediate threat of a hybrid war, it is necessary to consider what conditions must be met in order for this war to be effective. An indispensable element conducive to conflict is the multifaceted crisis in the attacked state, i.e. lack of strong and stable power, poorly organized military and security services, or a conflicted and divided society. An important element supporting the aggressor is also support for him among ethnic minorities and the possibility of a well-conducted, effective propaganda campaign. At present, it seems that these conditions have no reason to exist. We can expect a wider scale of disinformation policy on the international arena aimed at disrupting Poland with potential allies in order to break up the alliances arising against such a war.

The steps currently being taken to strengthen security both internally and internationally are conducted in the right direction and can give a sense of peace to the people of Poland. However, we must not forget that hybrid wars in contemporary conditions are one of the greatest threats to international security. In addition, they are a new phenomenon, unconventional and not yet fully recognized. They may take place in the political and economic arena, in cyberspace and in the media, which results in a complete lack of predictability.

Based on the article, it can be concluded that Poland is preparing for a possible hybrid conflict. Actions are taken and alliances are formed, which are designed to increase the security of our country against possible aggression.

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Streszczenie

W XXI wieku na arenie międzynarodowej dużego znaczenia nabrał nowy rodzaj konfliktów międzynarodowych – wojny hybrydowe. W obliczu trwającego kryzysu w sąsiadującej z naszym krajem Ukrainie, władze Polski zmuszone zostały do zwiększonej aktywności w zakresie bezpieczeństwa kraju. Poziom wydatków na obronność na przestrzeni ostatnich lat znacząco się zwiększa, modernizuje się armia i stale opracowywane są procedury bezpieczeństwa adekwatne do współczesnych zagrożeń. Podobne działania prowadzone są równolegle w Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ), Unii Europejskiej (UE) i Organizacji Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego (NATO), których Polska jest członkiem. Wszystkie te kampanie mają na celu zwiększenie bezpieczeństwa naszego kraju przed ewentualnym konfliktem hybrydowym.

Wojna hybrydowa – potencjalne zagrożenie dla Polski

Słowa kluczowe

wojny hybrydowe, terroryzm, zagrożenia, bezpieczeństwo Polski

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